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PROTECTING PARTY PURITY IN THE SELECTION

OF NOMINEES FOR PUBLIC OFFICE: THE
SUPREMES STRIKE DOWN CALIFORNIA'S
BLANKET PRIMARIES AND ENDANGER THE
OPEN PRIMARIES OF MANY STATES

by Gary D. Allison*
The true principle of a republic is, that the people should choose whom they please
to govern them. Representation is imperfect in proportion as the current of popular
favor is checked. This great source of free government, popular elections, should be
perfectly pure, and the most unbounded liberty allows.'

I.

INTRODUCTION

On June 26, 2000, in CaliforniaDemocraticParty v. Jones,2 the United States
Supreme Court, by a vote of 7 to 2,' declared California's blanket primary law a
violation of political parties' First Amendment rights of association.4 Blanket
primaries offer all voters "the same ballot, and a voter is not limited to the
candidates of any single party but may vote, as to each office contested, for any
candidate regardless of party affiliation." 5 Under California's version of the
blanket primary, which was voted into law in 1996 by overwhelming voter
approval of Proposition 198,6 "the candidate of each political party who receives
the most votes for a state elective office becomes the nominee of that party at the
next general election.",7 Thus, unlike the more traditional closed primaries,8 which

* Professor of Law, and Co-Director of the Public Policy Certificate Program, University of Tulsa
College of Law. LL.M., Columbia University School of Law (1976); J.D., University of Tulsa College
of Law (1972); B.A., University of Tulsa (1968).
1. Alexander Hamilton, quoted in 2 ELLIOT'rS DEBATES 257 as replicated in Powell v.
McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,540-41 (1969).
2. 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000) [hereinafter Jones].
3. Justice Scalia wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas and Breyer. Justice Breyer filed a concurring opinion.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, which was joined in part by Justice Ginsburg. Jones, 120 S.
Ct. at 2405.
4. See Jones, 120 S. Ct at 2414.
5. CaliforniaDemocraticParty v. Jones, 984 F. Supp. 1288, 1292 (E.D. Cal. 1997), affd,169 F.3d
646 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000) [hereinafter Jones District].
6. Proposition 198, an initiative petition, was approved by a vote of "59.51 percent (3,340,642
votes) to 40.49 percent (2,273,064 votes)." JonesDistrict,984 F. Supp. at 1291.
7. Jones District,984 F. Supp. at 1290.

Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2000

1

Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 36 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 4

TULSA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36:59

permit only voters affiliated with a political party to participate, 9 and limit their
participation to choosing among the candidates of the party to which they are
affiliated, 0 blanket primaries permit unaffiliated voters, and voters from other
parties, to help determine a party's general election nominees.1
"Opponents of Proposition 198 contended that [permitting voters affiliated
in one party to participate in the primaries of other parties] would work an
unconstitutional interference with the right of the parties to choose their
nominees. 12 Both the United States District Court and the United States Court
of Appeals rejected the opponents' challenge, 3 essentially holding that "the
burden [imposed by blanket primaries] on [political parties'] rights of association
was not a severe one, and was justified ...[because blanket primaries] 'enhance[ ]
the democratic nature
of the election process and the representativeness of
14
officials."",
elected
In overturning the lower courts' decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court, per
Justice Scalia, held that Proposition 198 imposed a severe burden on political
parties because it "force[d them] to adulterate their candidate selection
process ... by opening it up to persons wholly unaffiliated with [them]," thereby
producing the "likely outcome.., of changing [their] message."' 5 It further held
that state interests purportedly served by the blanket primary were not
compelling, and in any event the blanket primary was not narrowly tailored to
serve them. 6
This article will demonstrate that Jones is a very significant case because the
Court struck a new balance between the associational rights of political parties to
define themselves and their messages and States' constitutional authority to
regulate the time, place and manner of elections that appears to favor greatly
political partisanship. It will do so by providing:
1. a brief history of primary elections that illustrates how public policy in
the United States has moved increasingly in the direction of reducing

8. Proposition 198 ended California's use of closed primaries, which it had conducted continuously
since 1909. JonesDistrict,984 F. Supp. at 1290 n.2.
9. See Federal Election Commission, PARTY AFILIATION AND PRIMARY VOTING 2000,
<http:lw;vw.fec.gov/votregis/primaryvoting.htm>[hereinafter referred to as PRIMARY VOTING 2000]

which defines the closed primary as one where "[v]oters receive a ballot listing only those candidates
for office in the party with which they are registered [,and u]naffiliated voters may not vote."
10. Id.
11. Jones District, 984 F. Supp. at 1290, wherein District Judge Levi observed that "it is possible
under the blanket primary for independent voters, and voters registered in one party to participate in
the primary election of another party." For example, "a registered Democratic Party voter ...could
vote for a Republican candidate for Governor." Id.
12. Jones District,984 F. Supp. at 1290. Opponents buttressed their contention with this colorful
Southern California analogy: "Allowing members of one party a large voice in choosing another
party's nominee ...is like letting UCLA's football team choose USC's head coach." Id.

13. See id. at 1289; CaliforniaDemocraticParty v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 647-48 (9th Cir. 1999), rev'd,
120 S. Ct. 2402 (2000) (adopting verbatim District Judge Levi's opinion as its own).

14. Justice Scalia's characterization of the District and Circuit Courts' holdings, Jones, 120 S. Ct. at
2406.

15. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2412.
16. See id.at 2412-14.
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political party influence on elections and governance since the turn of
the century,
2.

an account of the competing arguments raised in this case that connects

them to the nation's two hundred year debate about the merits of
political parties,
3.

a constitutional analysis of the Jones decision that shows it is somewhat
surprising and not very well protective of the valid interests of either
the political parties or the States despite its tilt in favor of partisan

politics.
II.
A.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF PRIMARY ELECTIONS

Origins of the PrimaryElection

Traditionally, states have used primary elections to determine general
election nominees for each qualified political party 17 that has more than one
candidate seeking an elective office.18 At the turn of the century, in response to
the so-called Progressive movement, the States adopted the mandatory primary
election to democratize the process of selecting the parties' general election

nominees.' 9 Prior to the advent of primary elections, parties selected their general
election nominees at party conventions or caucuses20 that were allegedly
controlled by small numbers of party insiders tied to powerful, well-organized
interest groups. 2' Reformers believed that primary elections would reduce the
17. Qualified political parties are those which have demonstrated enough support among the
electorate so that States will place their nominees for public office on general election ballots under
their designation. For example, in California a political party is qualified
if it meets one of three conditions: (1) in the last gubernatorial election, one of its statewide
candidates polled at least two percent of the statewide vote; (2) the party's membership is at
least one percent of the statewide vote at the last preceding gubernatorial election; or (3)
voters numbering at least 10 percent of the statewide vote at the last gubernatorial election
sign a petition stating that they intend to form a new party.
Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2405 n. 1, citingto CAL. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 5100 (West 1996 and Supp. 2000).
18. For example, see below Oklahoma's primary election statute, found at OKLA.STAT., tit. 26, § 1102:
§1-102. Primary elections
A Primary Election shall be held on the fourth Tuesday in August of each even- numbered
year, at which time each political party recognized by the laws of Oklahoma shall nominate
its candidates for the offices to be filled at the next succeeding General Election, unless
otherwise provided by law. No candidate's name shall be printed upon the General Election
ballot unless said candidate shall have been nominated as herein provided, unless otherwise
provided by law; provided further that this provision shall not exclude the right of a
nonpartisan candidate to have his name printed upon said General Election ballots ....
19. See, James M. Burns, THE DEADLOCK OFDEMOCRACY 82-83 (1967) [hereinafter DEADLOCK].
20. See id. at 81.
21. Professor James MacGregor Burns has explained that the primary election arose out of the
collapse of the Democratic Party as an effective competitor of the Republican Party after the election
of 1896. Id. at 82-83. The Democratic Party's collapse eliminated the competition that mitigated the
excesses of the convention system which had prior to 1896 provided "a good deal of democracy
'between' the parties in that each had to be on its best behavior to please a majority of voters." Id. at
82. But, "[w]hen the pendulum swung heavily to the Republicans... the great safeguard against
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influence of party insiders and powerful interest groups on electoral politics by
giving every party member eligible to vote under state law an equal opportunity to
help determine his or her party's nominees for elective offices. 2 Consistent with
this view, a fragmented Wisconsin legislature voted in 1903 to submit a mandatory
primary law to a vote of the people during the elections of 1904. 2 In 1904, the
people of Wisconsin voted ovenvhelmingly in support of the mandatory primary,24
thereby placing the nation's first mandatory primary law on the books. "[W]ithin
a dozen years virtually all but a handful of the states had established primaries,
most of them mandatory."25
B.

Blanket & Open Primaries

For some reformers, simply forcing political parties to choose their nominees
for elected offices through a direct primary was not enough to excise the
corrupting influence of party politics on the electoral process. In1898, John R.
Commons, a Wisconsin social scientist, spoke for many... Progressives... when
he declared:
now that the official ballot is secret, so that a voter's declaration and oath of [party]
affiliation at the primary are not binding, it would seem to be the true interest of the
parties in framing a primary election law in order to protect themselves from
nominations by voters under duress, to make the primary also secret. This could be
done by a blanket ballot containing the names of all candidates for nomination
by
6
all parties, and by dispensing with all declarations or oaths of party affiliation.!

Obviously Commons favored the blanket primary, but his view has prevailed in
only four (4) states: Alaska, California, Louisiana, and Washington.
Scant support for the blanket primary does not mean the States have

convention excesses disappeared." Id. "[T]he 'one party era'... coincided with the upthrust of... the
progressive... revolt against the oligarchs that had ruled American business and politics since the Civil
War." Id. "[P]rogressives ...
revolt[ed] against 'machines' that supposedly controlled the conventions,
the Senate, and the cities, just as they controlled food packing, oil and the utilities." Id. at 83. The
revolt "focused on the conventions, where the party bosses in the back rooms made their corrupt deals
with one another and with their fellow-oligarchs in the citadels of big business." DEADLOCK, supra
note 19,at 82.
22. "The remedy [to the excesses of the convention system] was.., abolition.... [W]isconsin
passed the first state-wide primary with teeth in 1903 ....
" Id. at 83. This remedy served the
Progressive agenda of facilitating "direct participation of the people in managing political affairs, with
as little control by leaders as possible." Id.
See also William J.Crotty, The Philosophies of Party Reform, in PARTY RENEWAL IN AMERICA:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 31, 33-34 (1980 Gerald M. Pomper ed.) [hereinafter Philosophies in
RENEWAL]; Austin Ranney, CURING THE MNSCHIEFS OF FACTION: PARTY REFORM IN AMERICA 1719, 25-26, 80-82, 119-26 (1975) [hereinafter MIsCHIEM].
23. Allen F. Lovejoy, LA FOLLETrE AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DIRECT PRIMARY IN
WIsCONsIN: 1890-1904 76-82 (1941) [hereinafter LA FOLLETrE PRIMARY].
24. The outcome of the referendum was 61.9 percent (130,699 votes) in favor of the direct primary
to 38.1 percent (80,192 votes) against it. Id. at 91.
25. DEADLOCK, supra note 19, at 83.
26. MSCHIEFs, supra note 22, at 167-68, quoting a John R. Commons' address published in the
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON PRACTICAL REFORM OF PRIMARY ELECrIONS,

JANUARY 20-22 (1898).
27. See Jones District,984 F.Supp. at 1292.
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continued to support strongly partisan closed primaries. The Wisconsin primary
approved in 1904 was an open primary,28 which permits voters, regardless of party
affiliation, to decide on primary election day which party's primary they wish to
participate in.29 Blanket and open primaries permit "any person, regardless of
party affiliation,... [to] vote for a party's nominee. '30 They differ in that the
voter's "choice is limited to that party's nominees for all offices. He may not, for
nominee for Governor and a Democratic nominee
example, support a Republican
1
general.'
for attorney
32
Although open primaries were not immediately popular, 33now
primaries;
open
fully
* twenty (20) states now have
*

two (2) states are for all practical purposes fully open primary states
in that any voter can declare or change a party affiliation on primary
day through same-day registration at the polls;M
* eleven (11) states have partially open primaries, which permit
independents the opportunity to vote in primary elections but
require 35partisans to participate only in primaries of their own
parties;
* and Florida's primaries are closed unless all of the candidates for an
office are from one party, in which case all voters, regardless of
36
party affiliation, may vote for their favorite candidate.
This means that in these open primary states, political parties face the risk that the
outcome of their primaries will be determined by the votes of voters unaffiliated
with them,37 a risk Justice Scalia found in Jones to be a severe burden on the
28. See MisCisEFS, supranote 22, at 161.
29. See definition of Open Primary in PRIMARY VOTING 2000, supra note 9.
30. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2409 n.6.
31. Id.
32. As late as 1975, only Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, and Vermont had
joined Wisconsin in implementing them. Jones at 5 n.6.
33. These states include Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See PRIMARY VOTING 2000, supranote 9.
34. These states are Iowa, a purportedly partially open primary state, and Wyoming, a purportedly
closed primary state. See PRIMARY VOTING 2000, supra note 9.
35. In Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Rhode Island,
and Utah, independent voters may choose on election day which party's primary to participate in. See
id. In Maryland and Oregon, independent voters may choose to participate in one party's primary
among all of the parties who consent to having independents vote in their primaries, but in 2000 only
the Republican Party has consented in Maryland and only the Democratic Party has consented in
Oregon. Id. In West Virginia, independents may participate in only the Republican Party's primaries.
Id.
36. See PRIMARY VOTING 2000, supranote 9.
37. Beyond extending participation in a party's primary to persons unaffiliated with it, several of
the states with blanket, fully open, or partially open primaries have adopted laws making it even more
difficult for political parties to recruit and retain loyal members. All four (4) blanket primary states,
and nine (9) of the fully open primary states, protect the privacy of the voters' choices as to which
party's primary to participate in by allowing them to make the choice "within the privacy of the voting
booth." These states are Alaska, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
plus its definition of
Montana, North Dakota, Vermont, Washington, and Wisconsin. See generally id.,
O(pc)= Open (Private Choice).
Twenty-two (22) of the twenty-four (24) blanket and fully open primary states do not require
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political parties' rights of association. 8 As a consequence, Jones arguably nullifies
open primaries.

39

C. Anti-PartisanPoliciesBehind Blanket & Open Primaries
Reasons why certain States have supported open and blanket primaries are
illustrative of how public policy has disfavored partisanship increasingly since the
turn of the century. Generally, persons favoring the open primary have tended to
"vote for the man and not the party" and to believe that "the open primary
guarantees freedom of voting for everyone by allowing independents to vote in

primaries and partisans to change their minds., 40

Opening primaries to

independent voters makes the voter's choice to be unaffiliated more attractive.41
Letting voters affiliated with one political party choose to vote in the primaries of
other parties sets up a potential contest between the voter's party loyalty and her
desire to support a very attractive candidate in another party.42
voters to state their party affiliation when registering to vote. These states include Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, North Dakota, Ohio, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington,
and Wisconsin. See id. Only the blanket primary states of California and Louisiana require voters to
state their party affiliation when registering. See id.
Conversely, some fully open and partially open primary states impose certain conditions on
voters that may discourage or limit their participation in primary elections and/or help parties secure
information useful to gathering support for themselves and their candidates. In seven (7) states,
independents are deemed by law to have registered as a member of a party by participating in its
primary. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, North Carolina, Rhode Island, New Hampshire,
and Texas. See id. Massachusetts also imposes this condition, but only in presidential primaries. Id.
But, the voter can reverse the registration before leaving the polling place in New Hampshire and
Massachusetts, id., and the registration is informal and effective only for the current election year in
Texas. Id.
Four (4) states require voters to vote the same party ballot during a run-off election that they
voted during the immediately preceding primary election. These states are Arkansas, Georgia, North
Carolina, and Texas. See Primary Voting 2000, supranote 9.
The voters' choices of which party's primary to participate in are publicly recorded in ten (10)
states. These states include Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Ohio,
South Carolina, Vermont, and Virginia, but the choice is recorded only for presidential primaries in
Vermont. Id. Seven (7) of these states, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, South Carolina,
and Virginia, explicitly make such records available to the political parties. Id.
38. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2412.
39. Indeed, Judge Levi stated that if blanket primaries were unconstitutional on their face because
they violated the parties' associational rights to limit "candidate selection to their own members,...
[then] open primaries would also be unconstitutional upon any party's objection, [for] an open
primary, every bit as much as a blanket primary, permits voters who are not registered in a party to
vote in that party's primary. Jones District, 984 F. Supp. at 1295. As a consequence, Judge Levi
declined to find blanket primaries facially unconstitutional in part because "many of the States have
some version of an open primary and to invalidate them all on this theoretical ground would be an
extraordinary intrusion into the complex and changing election laws of the States and would remove
from the American political system a method for candidate selection that many States consider
beneficial and which in the uncertain future could take on new appeal and importance." Id.
40. MNsCHIFS, supra note 22, at 168.
41. For example, "Massachusetts, a state where Democrats hold 82 percent of the state House and
Senate seats .... [is] second only to Alaska in its percentage of independent voters. That is partly
because the Bay State's unusual election laws allow independents to vote in party primaries." Michael
Grunwald, Voters Shunning Party Identification, Loyalty, WASHINGTON POST, January 03, 1999, A01
(final ed.) [hereinafter Shunning Loyalty]. In fact, the registered electorate in Massachusetts is 49%
Independents, 37% Democrats, 13% Republicans. Id.
42. This is a contest many registered Democrats in Michigan resolved in favor of Senator John
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Washington was the first state to adopt the blanket primary, doing so in 1935
in order to "allow all properly registered voters to vote for their choice at any
primary election, for any candidate for office, regardless of party affiliation and
without a declaration of political faith or adherence on the part of the voter." 43 In
sustaining Washington's blanket primary against constitutional attack, the
Washington Supreme Court stated in 1936 that "[t]his declaration of policy clearly
indicates the purpose of affording secrecy to the individual voter as to his party
affiliations as well as to his choice of individual candidates." 44 Forty-four (44)
years later, the Washington Supreme Court rebuffed another constitutional attack
on Washington's blanket primary by finding that it serves the compelling state
interests of "allowing each voter to keep party identification, if any, secret;
allowing the broadest possible participation in the primary
election; and giving
45
each voter a free choice among all candidates in a primary.1
Alaska first enacted the blanket primary through a referendum in 1947. 46
Those who supported it largely were persons "who [we]re not firmly aligned with
a political party, and who believe[d] that the voter should have maximum
independence in balloting matters ....47 However, the debate over the blanket
primary also contained an element of partisanship, for Democrats opposed it out
of belief that it would erode party loyalty and permit Republicans to cross-over to
support the weakest Democratic candidates, 48 and Republicans supported it "in
hopes that Republican candidates would benefit by attracting conservative
Democrats and non-aligned voters." 49

"[Alaska's] blanket primary was replaced by the single ballot open primary"
in 1959 after the Democrats took control of both houses of the legislature and won
the Governor's office. 0 It was restored in 1967, after the Republicans' swept the
state elections of 1966.51 Supporters of the restoration contended that the blanket
primary fit Alaska's political environment in that "[darned few] ... people
actually are active workers in the two parties," 52 and that "probably nine of every
McCain, the reform-Republican candidate for President, during the 2000 presidential primary season,
for Democrats constituted eighteen percent (18%) of the Michigan Republican presidential primary
vote. R. NV. Apple, Jr., THE 2000 CAMPAIGN NEWS ANALYSIS; On a Rocky Road, the Race

Tightens, Feb. 23, 2000, A, at 1 (final ed.) [hereinafter Rocky Road]. Moreover, independents
constituted 35% of the Michigan Republican presidential primary vote, meaning that Republican

voters constituted less than half of those who voted in the Michigan Republican presidential primary.
Id. As a consequence, Senator McCain's popularity among independent and cross-over voters enabled
him to win the Michigan primary despite losing 2/3ds of the Republican vote to Governor George W.

Bush. Id.
43. 1935 Wash. Laws Ch. 26, §5.
44. Anderson v. Millikin, 59 P.2d 295,296 (1936).
45. Heavey v. Chapman, 611 P.2d 1256,1259 (1980).
46. See O'Callaghan v. State of Alaska, 914 P.2d 1250, 1255 (Ak. Sup. Ct. 1996), cert. denied sub.
nom, Republican Party of Alaska v. O'Callaghan, 520 U.S. 1209 (1997).
47. Id. at 1256.
48. See id. at 1255.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1256.
51. See id.
52. O'Callaghan, 914 P.2d at 1256. State Senator Robert Blodgett, a Democrat, explaining his

support for the blanket primary.
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ten voters want to vote for the man, not the party.
In 1990, the Alaska Republican Party adopted a rule that conflicted with
Alaska's blanket primary by permitting only Republicans and independents to
vote in its primaries. 4 This rule lead to constitutional challenges being brought
against Alaska's blanket primary that began in 1992 and ended in 1996.5 Alaska
successfully defended its blanket primary with three major justifications: "it
encourages voter turnout, maximizes voters' freedom of choice among candidates,
and tends to ensure that the officers elected are representative of the people to be
governed in that it forces the major political parties to have a broad cross-section
of support from the voters." 56 Alaska also gave great emphasis to the fact that
most voters in Alaska are nonpartisan or undeclared.57
Unlike Washington and Alaska, Louisiana appears not to have had any
noble goals in mind when it adopted its version of the blanket primary. It was
"adopted in advance of the 1975 elections at the behest of then-Governor Edwin
Edwards, who was annoyed in 1971 when he had to take on Republican David
Treen in the general election after fighting through two tough Democratic
primaries."58 Given its purpose, to prevent front-runners from having to endure
two or more elections, the Louisiana blanket primary is in reality a non-partisan
primary which confronts all voters with a list of all candidates running for an
office, elects to office anyone getting more that 50% of the primary vote, and
sends to the general election the two top vote-getters, irrespective of party, if no

one achieves a majority.59
53. Id. State Senator Robert Ziegler, a Republican, explaining his support for the blanket primary.
54. See id.at 1252.
55. See id. at 1250, 1252-53.
56. Id. at 1262-63 (internal quotation omitted).
57. See id. at 1263. In fact, as of 1994:
there were 340,464 registered voters in Alaska. Of these more than 182,000 voters were
registered as nonpartisan or undeclared. By contrast, there were 78,212 registered
Republicans, 59,782 registered Democrats, 12,936 registered Alaskan Independence Party
members, 2,558 Green Party members, and 4,595 "other" party members. Thus
approximately fifty-four percent of all registered voters in Alaska were nonpartisan or
undeclared, whereas approximately twenty-three percent were registered Republicans and
approximately eighteen percent were registered Democrats.
Id. at 1256.
58. Jack Wardlaw, Open Primary System Debated; Legislature Considering Change by '98, THE
TImES-PICAYUNE, December 13, 1996, at A3 (3d ed.) [hereinafter PrimaryChange].
Governor Edwards was a Democratic governor at a time when the Democratic Party dominated
Louisiana politics, as it had since the end of Reconstruction. See Jack Wardlaw, PartyLines Remained
Blurred. Foster Reinforces Trend in Louisiana Politics, TIMES-PICAYUNE, Nov. 1, 1999, at Al
[hereinafter Party Blurred] (noting that David Treen became the first Republican Governor since
Reconstruction in 1980, and that until recently "almost everyone in public life was a Democrat, but the
party was sharply divided between supporters and opponents of Huey and Earl Long"). Therefore, it
was not anticipated that the non-partisan primary would facilitate the revival of the Republican Party,
with David Treen becoming the first Republican governor since Reconstruction in 1980, id., and the
percentage of voters registering Republican quintupling from five (5%) to twenty-five (25 %) since the
advent of the non-partisan primary. See Primary Change, supra note 58 (quoting Republican State
Representative Peppi Bruneau extolling the gains in Republican registration since the initiation of
Louisiana's non-partisan primary).
59. See Jones District,984 F.Supp. at 1292; See also Primary Change,supra note 58.
Federal statutes established "[t]he Tuesday next after the 1st Monday in November, in every
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The prime backers of California's blanket primary were moderate
Republicans who had tried unsuccessfully for over twenty years to enact a blanket
primary 60 as a means of helping moderates defeat hard-right conservatives in
61
Republican primaries. Impetus for the successful Proposition 198 venture came
from the defeat of Tom Campbell, a moderate Republican Congressman, by
Bruce Herschensotn, an extremely right-wing well-known television
commentator, in the 1992 Republican United States Senate Primary. 62
Herschensohn went on to lose the general election to "Barbara Boxer, a
representative who was as far to the left on the political spectrum as
Herschensohn was to the right," 63 and who had also defeated a moderate in the
Democratic United States Senate primary. 64 Believing that Campbell would have
won had he survived the Republican primary, 65 disappointed
moderate
66
effort.
198
Proposition
the
lead
to
him
enlisted
Republicans
even numbered year, ... as the day for the election... of Representatives[,] Delegates [and Senators]
to the Congress .... 2 U.S.C. § 7 (quoted in part, and modified in part to account for the elections of
Senators as provided in 2 U.S.C. § 1), and requiring that all elections for Congress and President be
held on the same day. 3 U.S.C. § 1. In 1997, the United States Supreme Court held that Louisiana's
blanket primary, as applied to the elections of United States Senators and Representatives, violates
these statutes. Foster v. Love, 522 U.S. 67, 68-69, 73-74 (1997). The violation resulted from the fact
that under all congressional primaries held since 1975, 48 of the 57 "contested elections for United
States Representative," and 5 of 6 "contested elections for United States Senator" were decided by a
candidate receiving a majority vote during the October primary. Love, 522 U.S. at 71 n.1. As a
consequence, the Court found that Louisiana's blanket primary produced results contrary to the
policies behind the federal statutes establishing the general election days for Congress and the
Presidency in that it "had the effect of conclusively electing more than 80% of the State's Senators and
Representatives before the election day elsewhere, and, in presidential election years, having forced
voters to turn out for two potentially conclusive federal elections." Love, 522 U.S. at 74. To date, the
author has found no indication that either Louisiana or the United States has changed its election laws
to alleviate the conflict.
60. The early prime movers were Susan Harding, a moderate Republican activist, and Houston
Flournoy, a moderate Republican and former state controller. See Ed Mendel, Proposition198 Would
Widen Voter Choices, THE SAN DIEGO UNoN-TIUBuNE, March 11, 1996, at A-1, A-13 of News
Section [hereinafter Widen Choices]. When he was state controller, Flournoy "sponsored an
unsuccessful open-primary bill in the early 1970s." Id. Harding worked on unsuccessful attempts to
get open-primary initiative petitions to a vote of the people in 1979,1984, and 1986. Id. The latter day
prime-movers, the key sponsors of Proposition 198, were United States Representative Tom Campbell,
a moderate Republican politician who lost the 1992 Republican United States Senate Primary by a
hard-right candidate who went on to lose big to a Democratic liberal candidate, See David S. Broder, A
Sea Change in CaliforniaPolitics, THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRmuNE, Apr. 3, 1996, at B6 of Opinion
Section [hereinafter Sea Change], and the late computer magnate David Packard, who Campbell
persuaded "to put up $200,000 in matching money." Widen Choices, supra note 60.
61. See Widen Choices, supra note 60. See also James 0. Goldsborough, Voters Deserve a Better
Choice than Tweedledee and..., THE SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 4, 1996, at B7 of Opinion
Section [hereinafter Tweedledee], which noted that the 1992 California Senate race was very similar to
the 1968 Senate race, in which a well-thought-of moderate Republican U.S. Senator, Tom Kuchel, was
defeated by a right-winger in the Republican primary after being targeted by John Birchers. The
Bircher candidate, Max Rafferty, went on to lose to a very liberal Democrat, Alan Cranston. See id.
Many observers believed Cranston could not have defeated Kuchel. See id.
62. See Sea Change, supranote 60.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See Widen Choices,supra note 60. Campbell's efforts on behalf of the blanket primary paid off,
for he won the 2000 California U.S. Senate Primary by defeating two more conservative candidates.
See David Broder, Approval of the Blanket System Could Bury Party System, THE DENVER POST, May
3, 2000, at Bl [hereinafter Bury Party]. Unfortunately for Congressman Campbell, he is running
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To broaden their base of support to include all moderates and independents,
Proposition 198 proponents argued that a blanket primary "would help end
partisan gridlock in the Legislature and congressional delegation by electing
moderate candidates who appeal to both parties and want to solve problems, not
wage ideological warfare." 67 To make this case, they asserted that both
Democrats and Republicans tended to nominate highly partisan ideologues under
the closed primary system,(s thereby producing general elections featuring "'a
Leon Trotsky Democrat and [an] Attilla the Hun Republican.' ' 69 They then
alleged that a closed primary system "that rewards partisanship and ideological
extremism" creates state government gridlock because it leads to the election of
ideological officeholders who "spen[d] more time fighting with each other and
promoting narrow political agendas than they spend doing their jobs."70 Similarly,
it was charged that as a result of the closed primary system, "California is known
for sending the most divided and divisive congressional delegation to Washington
of any state.'
Proposition 198 proponents also characterized their campaign as a crusade to
end voter disenfranchisement. They asserted that the blanket primary would
72
enfranchise independent voters denied the right to vote in closed primaries.
Noting that the primary elections of the dominant party are the only ones that
count in safe districts, 73 and that two thirds of California's legislative districts are
safe, 74 the promoters charged that the closed primary had effectively
disenfranchised the many California voters who lived in safe districts and were not
affiliated with the dominant party.75 Finally, the proponents claimed that the
blanket primary would end the disenfranchisement of the disaffected, thereby
reversing declining voter participation, by giving "the 60 percent of Americans,
who describe themselves as moderates, 7 6 general elections that are contests
among moderate candidates instead of battles among extremists nominated in

against Senator Feinstein, California's most popular politician. Evelyn Nieves, The CaliforniaSenate
Race: G.O.P.Long Shot Offers A Touch of the Radical, NEW YoRK TIMES, Aug. 24, 2000, at A21, col.
1,2. As of August 24,2000, he trailed Senator Feinstein fifty-two percent (52%) to thirty-three (33%).
Id., at col. 1. Besides Senator Feinstein's popularity, Congressman Campbell faced two other huge
issues: He has been unable to secure the core Republican base because he "supports abortion rights in

a state where conservative, anti-abortion Republicans rule the roost[,] ...[and] Democrats and
independents don't trust his party label." Id.
67. Widen Choices, supranote 60.
68. See Tweedledee, supra note 61.
69. Id. (quoting from an unidentified article in the CALIFORNIA JOURNAL).
70. Lucy Killea & Rebecca Q. Morgan, Open Primary Could Open Gridlock, THE SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, March 21, 1996, at B9 of Opinion Section [hereinafter Gridlock].
71. Tweedledee, supra note 61.
72. At that time, California had 1.5 million independent voters, see Gridlock,supra note 70, which
constituted about 10% of persons registered to vote. See Widen Choices,supranote 60.
73. See Gridlock, supra note 70. Safe districts are defined as districts in which one party is so
dominant that its nominees are virtually guaranteed victory in the general election. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. James 0. Goldsborough, Avoiding Governing from the Margins, THE SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIBUNE, March 25,1996, at B7 of Opinion Section [hereinafter Avoiding Margins].

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss1/4

10

20001

Allison: Protecting Party Purity in the Selection of Nominees for Public O
PROTECTING PARTY PURITY
77

closed primaries.
In sum, analysis of the policies behind the spread of open and blanket
primaries reveals a progressive public hostility toward parties and the basic
functions they have historically performed. Parties historically helped aggregate,
coordinate, and reconcile the countless interests around which have coalesced
individuals "who are interested more in power than in principles.,

78

Primary

elections were created expressly to impede this party function, since they were
implemented to reduce the governmental influence of powerful coalitions
between party insiders and well-organized interest groups by democratizing the
selection of party nominees for general elections. 79 Parties also have provided
voters with a choice of competing visions of how government should operate and
issues should be resolved. 8 Increasingly, the public, by implementing open and
blanket primaries, has subordinated the parties' political choice function to its
desire to enhance the voting rights of unaffiliated voters, protect the privacy of

77. See id. wherein James 0. Goldborough makes this argument by envisioning the following
scenario:
Consider the cases of two voters: Joe Blow, moderate Republican; Mary Doe, centrist
Democrat. Statistically, Joe and Mary represent 60 percent of Americans, who describe
themselves as moderates.
Joe and Mary believe in many of the same things: hard work, strong families, a good
education system, a responsible foreign policy, good roads, a balanced budget. Like most
Americans, they are willing to pay taxes for good government.
Their central difference is the central difference between Republicans and Democrats for
the past half-century: the relative size of government: Joe wants a little less; Mary is willing
to pay slightly higher taxes for a little more government.
Joe and Mary used to vote in the primaries, but found their candidates rarely won. Joe's
candidate would be defeated by an anti-abortion or anti-gun-control advocate with lots of
money and little else.
Mary's candidate would be defeated by an anti-free-trade populist drawing primarily on
trade union support.
Result: Joe and Mary have been voting less lately, both in primary and general elections.
They sit on the sidelines more, frustrated that so few of the candidates speak to their
concerns.
They are as mainstream as Grover's Comers or Gopher Prairie, yet the California system is
failing them.
Under open primaries, all the candidates, with their party affiliations, will be listed
together. The top Republican wins, the top Democrat wins. Everybody, including
independents, has a chance to vote for "the better person."
Far from working against the two-party system, Proposition 198 will bring Joe and Mary
back, re-energizing the system. The single-interest candidates now winning the primaries
will have a tougher time once Joe and Mary are joined in the voting booth by
disenfranchised independents.
The result will be fewer general elections between protectionists and gun advocates, and
more between mainstream Republicans and Democrats.
78. See Gerald M. Pomper, The Contributionsof PoliticalPartiesto American Democracy, PARTY
RENEWAL IN AmRICA: THEORY AND PRACTICE 1, 5-7 (1980, Gerald M. Pomper, ed.) [hereinafter
Party Contributions].
79. See id. at 4-6, especially n.21.
80. See id. at 7-8.
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voters, and muffle ideological differences among elected officials.8' As reformers
moved from trying to prevent corrupt ties between government and vested
interests to attempting to shape the ideological messages of political parties, they
began intruding on the associational rights of political parties that the U.S.
Supreme Court sought to protect in Jones.
HI. THE COMPETING ARGUMENTS
A.

The Basic Conflict

The basic conflict between the Jones adversaries was raised by "a simple
question: what is the purpose of a primary election?"' ' Petitioners, consisting of
the California Democratic Party, the California Republican Party, the Libertarian
Party of California, and the Peace and Freedom Party,83 answered by asserting
that "the primary is the major theater for resolving ideological struggles within a
political party." 84 A broader perspective was offered by the Respondents, Bill
Jones, California Secretary of State, and Californians for an Open Primary.8 5
They insisted that "primary elections are an integral part of the democratic
process by which public officials are elected to administer government, 86
a
fundamentally public activity that narrows the field of candidates facing voters.,
These differing answers to a simple question reflect profoundly different political
philosophies.
Petitioners believe that parties "'exist to advance their members' shared
political beliefs,"' s7 and by doing so "play a unique role in promoting our national
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be wide-open and
robust. '' ss Recognizing that "'in the context of particular elections, candidates are
necessary to make the party's message known and effective... "'89 the Petitioners
argued that "[t]he nomination of candidates is the central function of a political
party," and that "[a] political party's right to choose its own nominees is core
associational activity" protected by the First Amendment." Concerned that "'the
inclusion of persons unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its
collective decisions,"' 91 Petitioners alleged that "California's... blanket
81. See id. at 9-19.
82. Respondents' Brief at 7, in California Democratic Party v. Jones, (No. 99-401) [hereinafter
Respondents' Brief].

83. See id. at ii.
84. Petitioners' Brief at 19-20, in California DemocraticParty v. Jones (No. 99-401) [hereinafter

Petitioners' Brief] (quoting from the heading of the Petitioners' first argument).
85. See Respondents' Brief at ii.

86. Id. at 7.
87. Petitioners' Brief at 17, quoting from I. Kennedy's opinion in Colorado Republican Federal
Election Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 629 (1996) (J. Kennedy,
concurring and dissenting).

88. Id.
89. Id. (quoting I. Kennedy's opinion in Colorado Republican Federal Election Campaign Comm.
v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 629 (1996) (J. Kennedy, concurring and dissenting)).
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Democratic Party of U.S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol36/iss1/4

12

2000]

Allison: Protecting Party Purity in the Selection of Nominees for Public O
PROTECTING PARTY PURITY

primary.., strikes at the very heart of party associational rights" by
"allow[ing]... voter[s] to join in a party's nominating process without requiring
92
any act of affiliation with the party.",
Projecting from their belief that the "primary [election] is the first, critical
step in... alow[ing] the citizens to choose their public officers," 93 and the fact
that "[o]nly political parties are given automatic ballot placement for their
candidates," 94 Respondents argued that political parties are "public and
governmental actors" subject to the States' powers to prescribe the manner of
holding elections for United States Senators and Representatives and to regulate
elections for state offices. 95 Therefore, they contended that political parties do not
have an absolute right to "limit[ ] candidate selection to their own members, 96 for
the States have sovereign rights to "structure [their]... government[s], which
include determining how their "citizens select those to govern." 97 Noting that the
citizens of California exercised California's power to regulate elections by
approving Proposition 198,98 the Respondents asserted that "[t]he State's interests
here are directly those of the people," and "spring ultimately from the citizens'
own First Amendment interests in effective democratic government." 99 Thus, the
Respondents alleged that the people believed their interests in effective
democratic government required the implementation of a blanket primary
because "California's closed primary system effectively disenfranchised millions of
voters, producing government officials unrepresentative of the public at large."' 1°
Moreover, the Respondents argued that since "'parties exist to advance their
members' shared political beliefs,"'1 1 the Court should hold that the political
parties were estopped from challenging California's blanket primary because of
the overwhelming approval their rank-and-file members gave to Proposition 198
in the initiative election.'0 2
The Respondents' goal of producing more responsive government officials
by extending the primary election franchise certainly echoes the Progressives' case
for primary elections - that the process of selecting party nominees for general
elections had to be democratized in order to reduce the corrupting influences of

(1981)).
92. Id.
93. Respondents' Brief at 14.
94. Id. at 15.
95. Id. at 14, 15 (quoted part at 15), citing to U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 4, cl. 1, and Tashjian v.
Republican Party of Connecticut, 479 U.S. 208,217 (1986).
96. Id. at 17.
97. Id. at 15-16 (quoted part at 16).
98. See id. at 15-17, especially n.4.
99. Respondents' Brief at 17.
100. Id. at 13.
101. Id. at 16 n.4, quoting Justice Kennedy's opinion in Colorado Republican Federal Election
Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604,629 (1996) (J. Kennedy, concurring and
dissenting).
102. See id. at 15-16 n.4, wherein the Respondents alleged that "61 percent of Democrats and 57
percent of Republicans voted for the initiative and it is 'likely that a majority of the members of
[minor] parties also favored the initiative."' (citation omitted).
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party insiders and powerful interest groups on electoral politics.103 But, the basic
conflict in Jones also reflects debates about the merits of political parties that
commenced prior to the ratification of the Constitution and have continued to this
day.
In FEDERALIST No. 10, Madison decried faction, by which he meant "a
number of citizens... who are united and actuated by some common impulse of
passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent
and aggregate interests of the community."' ' 4 He identified many mischiefs of
faction, including unstable governments, governmental disregard for the public
good, and injustice inflicted on the deserving minority "by the superior force of an
interested and overbearing majority."10 5 These mischiefs certainly share a kinship
with the complaints against political parties that have lead States to adopt evermore open primary elections. 1t0

Madison believed there were only two ways to "cur[e] the mischiefs of
faction:... remov[e] its causes... [or] control its effects."' 10 He argued
persuasively that the causes of faction could not be eliminated, because they arose
from the combination of liberty, man's inherent "zeal for different opinions
concerning religion.... government.... attachment [to] ... leaders," and the
"various and unequal distribution of property among men. '' 10 Differences of
opinion, he said, could not be extinguished because they are "sown in the nature
of man. '' °9 He proclaimed, rightly, that extinguishing liberty was a "remedy...
that.., was worse than the disease."11 The Jones Petitioners intensely ascribed to
this proclamation, for they fought for the liberty to maintain the effectiveness of
ideology-based political parties as effective means of turning their political beliefs
into action by electing like-minded officeholders. 1 '

103. See DEADLOCK, supra note 19, at 82-83; Philosophiesin RENEWAL, supra note 22, at 33-34;
MisCHms, supra note 22, at 17-19, 25-26, 80-82, 119-26.
104. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison), quoted in 43 GREAT BOOKS OF THE WESTERN
WORLD 49, 50 (Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed., 1978) [hereinafter FEDERALIST No. 101].

105. FEDERALIST No. 10 at 49, supra note 104.
106. See discussion infra Part II.B.-C. and accompanying footnotes.
107. FEDERALIST No. 10, supranote 104, at 50.
108. Id.
109. Id.

110. Proclaiming that "[1]iberty is to faction what air is to fire," Madison carried through with the
analogy by stating that: "it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life,
than it would be to wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life, because it imparts to
fire its destructive agency." Id. at 50.

111. See Petitioner's Brief at 17. Historically, however, there have been some extreme proposals put
forward as means of eliminating political parties. For example, James Hillhouse, a Federalist U.S.
Senator from Connecticut, argued in 1808 that:

[The office of President] serves as the rallying point of party... and cannot fail to bring
forth and array all the electioneering artillery of the country; and furnish the most

formidable means of organizing, concentrating, and cementing parties. And when a
President shall be elected by means of party influence, thus powerfully exerted, he cannot
avoid party bias, and will thence become the chief of a party, instead of taking the dignified

attitude of a President of the United States. If some other mode of filling the Presidential
chair than that of a general election throughout the United States were devised and adopted,
it would be impossible to form national parties.
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How then can the effects of faction be controlled? Madison said there were
only two means available: preventing "the existence of the same passion or
interest in a majority at the same time," and rendering any "majority... having
such co-existent passion or interest... [incapable of] concert[ing] and carry[ing]
into effect schemes of oppression.' 2 He believed a republican form of
government, by which he meant "a government in which the scheme of
representation takes place," would provide the controlling mechanisms."
How would a republican form of government control the effects of faction?
Madison expressed the hope that "refin[ing] and enlarg[ing] the public views, by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens" would cause "the
public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people,... [to] be more
consonant to the public good."" 4 Ever the realist, he admitted that this would not
happen unless the chosen body of citizens were comprised of persons "whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism
and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
considerations."" 5 He further admitted that the people chosen to be the people's
representatives could turn out to be "[m]en of factious tempers, of local
prejudices, or of sinister designs, [who] may, by intrigue, by corruption, or by
other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the
people.""16 With their focus on preventing corrupt ties between party leaders and
vested interests, and in avoiding ideological extremism, the arguments of the
Progressives for primary elections and the latter day reformers for more open
primary elections appear to be ,based on the premise 117that Madison's fears about
the nature of the people's representative came to pass.
How then can the republican form of government be refined to avoid the
selection of, or the problems created by the selection of, factious persons to be the
people's representatives? Madison's answer was that enlarging the republic would

MISCHIEFs, supra note 22, at 33. Nathan Cree, a political critique writing in the late 1800s, advocated
eliminating all legislative bodies and placing the lawmaking function directly in the hands of the people
through the initiative and referendum processes. Id., at 35-36. And another late 19th Century writer,
Albert Stickney, believing that parties were the evil effects of recurring elections, proposed allowing
the people to elect legislators only when there were open seats to fill, with the winners being able to
stay in office for life unless removed by the legislative body for poor performance. Id. at 36. Mounting
a more direct attack on parties, and allowing for the continuation of elections, yet another late 19th
Century writer, James Sayles Brown, promoted "a law declaring any candidate nominated by any...
political organization ineligible to the office for which he is designated." Id. at 36-37.
112. FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 104, at 51. It could be argued that, in seeking to prevent the
coalescence of a factious majority, Madison was advocating for the governmental gridlock so attacked
by the proponents of Proposition 198. But, in a recent book, the historian Garry Wills argues
persuasively that Madison and other Framers of the Constitution designed a new government they
hoped would be much more efficient than the government created by the Articles of Confederation.
Garry Wills, A NECESSARY EvIL: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN DIsTRUsT OF GOVERNMENT 71-82

(1999).
113. FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 104.

114. Id. at 52.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See discussion infra Part II.A.-B. (progressive arguments), Part II.C. (latter day reformer

arguments).
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prevent or reduce these problems because in large republics there will be a greater
"proportion of fit characters" relative to the number of representatives to be
selected and each representative will be chosen by a greater number of citizens. 18
Enlarging the republic is not particularly relevant to the current debate over
parties, but increasing the number of citizens who will select the people's
representatives clearly is. Madison argued that when "a greater number of
citizens" choose a representative "it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates
to practise with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried;
and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more likely to centre in
men who possess the most attractive merit and the most diffusive and established
character."11 9 This argument is reflected strongly in the claim of Proposition 198
supporters that a blanket primary, by subjecting each primary candidate to the
scrutiny of every primary voter, will prevent the selection of general election
candidates who are highly partisan ideologues.120
Madison as an anti-faction political theorist provided great philosophical
support for the anti-party sentiments driving the crusade for open and blanket
primary elections. But, Madison as one of the most effective politicians of his day
provided a remarkable demonstration of the usefulness of political parties to those
who wish to see their political beliefs reflected in government structure and policy.
Faced with Alexander Hamilton organizing a congressional caucus to put forward
domestic policies they believed put too much power in the hands of the federal
government, Madison and Jefferson formed their own congressional caucus as a
means of organizing effective opposition to Hamilton's schemes.121 Hamilton's
original caucus had attained a congressional majority tm so Madison and Jefferson
formed committees of correspondence involving non-officeholders as a means of
organizing campaigns to elect more congressmen and senators who shared their
views.1 3 This in turn forced Hamilton and his allies to act in kind. 24 As a result,
the United States' first nation-wide political parties were born: The Republican
Party of Jefferson and Madison and the Federalist Party of Hamilton and
Adams.H5 A precedent had been set: party organization had proved useful, even
essential, to the furtherance of important political ideas and the ambitions of
many politicians.1 6 Building on this precedent, a group of political scientists,
118. See FEDERALIST No. 10, supra note 104.
119. Id.
120. See Widen Choices, supra note 60; Tweedledee, supra note 61; Gridlock, supra note 70; and
Avoiding Margins,supra note 76.
121. See John H. Aldrich, WHY PARTIES? THE ORIGIN AND TRANSFORMATION OF PARTY POLITICS

IN AMERICA 78-80 (1995) [hereinafter WHY PARTIES].
122. See id. at 80.
123. See id. at 80-81.
124. See id. at 81.
125. See id. at 81-82.
126. In WHY PARTIEs, supra note 121, Professor Aldrich convincingly documented that this

precedent has held true through out America's political history, even as individual parties waxed and
waned and America's party system changed form. In this regard, Professor Aldrich provides an
excellent account of the development of the two party system featuring the Democratic and
Republican Parties as the major players. See id. at 98-99 (describing the demise of the Federalist Party
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organized under the name of Northern California Committee for Party Renewal,
filed an amicus brief in Jones in which they eloquently argued that the blanket
primary will damage the ability of parties to continue playing their "unique and
crucial role in our democratic system of government,"1 27 a role they described as
follows:
Parties enable citizens to participate coherently in a complex system of government,
allowing for substantial number of popularly elected offices. They bring fractured
and diverse groups together as a unified force, provide a necessary link between the
distinct branches and levels of government, and provide continuity that lasts beyond
terms of office. Parties also play important roles in encouraging active participation
in politics,... holding politicians accountable for their actions, and encouraging
debate and discussion of important issues.128
B.

The Legal Format

Though essentially philosophical in nature, the basic conflict between the
Petitioners and the Respondents had significant constitutional and legal
dimensions.
These dimensions are reflected in the two key issues addressed by the
9
courts:

12

and the disuniting of the Jeffersonian Republican Party); See id. at 99-125 (describing the emergence of
the Democratic Party as the first true mass political party based on Martin Van Buren's call to revive
the states' rights principles of Jefferson, to establish the primacy of party over individuals and to
exploit the personal popularity and policy vagueness of Andrew Jackson in order to develop a winning
presidential campaign around which to organize); See id. at 125-34 (describing the emergence of the
Whig Party as the second mass political party and the operation of a two party system in which
elections were organized by two intersectional parties anxious to avoid the controversial issue of
slavery); See id. at 135, 140-44 (describing the demise of the Whigs); See id. at 135, 144-56 (describing
the emergence of the new Republican Party organized around opposing slavery and the resulting
disintegration the Democratic Party's intersectional base, all of which led to a new two party system
featuring electoral competition between two sectionalist based parties over the issue of slavery).
127. Brief of Amicus Curiae Northern California Committee for Party Renewal, et. al., at 15
[hereinafter Renewal Amicus Brief].
128. Id.
129. The fact that the parties' rank-and-file members overwhelmingly approved Proposition 198 in
the initiative election gave rise to two additional issues of substantial interest to political theorists: (1)
Who may assert the associational rights of political parties? and (2) By what means must those
authorized to so do assert the political parties' associational rights? See Respondents' Brief at 15-16
n.4. Unfortunately for political junkies, the Courts gave little or no attention to these issues, so they
will not be discussed outside of this note.
In a footnote, Judge Levi dismissed the Respondents' arguments that the parties' rank-and-file
members voting in the initiative election gave Proposition 198 their parties' official approval. District
Jones, F. Supp. at 1294 n.16. The "votes" of Republicans and Democrats cast in the initiative election
were estimated through exit polls, but the "turnout by California's six minor parties was too small to
sample." Id. at 1291. As a consequence, Judge Levi would not conclude that the members of minor
parties had approved Proposition 198. Id. at 1294 n.16. Moreover, he would not accept the exit poll
results as proof that Democratic and Republican voters had approved Proposition 198 on behalf of
no other context do we accept the results of polling for the act of voting."
their parties because "[i]n
Id. Most importantly, after noting that all political "parties have selected certain procedures for the
modification of their rules," he held that "a poll of voters is not the equivalent of a decision by a party
according to the procedural rules of the party." Id.
Neither Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, nor Justice Kennedy, writing in concurrence,
mentioned these issues. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2405-14 (Scalia, J., writing for the majority), 120 S. Ct. at
2414-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Perhaps they ignored them because the Respondents' gave them a
low priority by relegating arguments on them to a footnote. Respondent's Brief at 15-16, n.4.
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1. Do political parties have associational rights protected by the First Amendment
to determine who participates in selecting their nominees for elective offices?
2. If so, to what extent do their constitutional powers to regulate federal and state
elections permit the States to override a party's decisions as to who is entitled to
participate in its primary elections?

The Petitioners' and Respondents' agreed that political parties do have
associational rights protected by the First Amendment with respect to who
participates in the selection of their nominees. This agreement was not explicit.
Rather, it was implicitly entered into by both sides debating the relevance of three
key U.S. Supreme Court decisions that recognized the associational rights of
political parties in resolving conflicts between State primary election laws and
party nominating rules:
1. Eu v. San Francisco County DemocraticCentral Committee,130 wherein the
Court held that a California law prohibiting the endorsement of primary
candidates by governing bodies of political parties violated the parties' speech and
131
association rights under the First Amendment;
2. Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,132 wherein the Court held
that Connecticut's prohibition against parties choosing to permit independent
voters to participate in their primary elections violated the parties' association
rights under the First Amendment; 33
134
3. Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette,
wherein the Court held that State presidential primary laws requiring national
political parties to honor the results of binding primaries in selecting delegates to
their national conventions, even though they violated the parties' delegate
selection rules, violated the parties' association rights under the First
Amendment. 135
The Petitioners and Respondents also agreed that States have considerable
authority to regulate elections. This agreement was explicit,"36 primarily because it

130. 489 U.S. 214 (1989) [herinafter referred to as Eu]. See Petitioners' Brief at 22, 26, 33, 38, 39;
Respondents' Brief at 9,16, 20, 22, 35.
131. Eu, 489 U.S. at 222-29.
132. 479 U.S. 208 (1986) [herinafter referred to as Tashjian]. See Petitioners' Brief at 21-26, 39;
Respondents' Brief at 9,15,16, 20-22, 28, 49.
133. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 213-25.
134. 450 U.S. 197(1981). See Petitioners' Brief at 17, 21, 26, 29, 30; Respondents' Brief at 9, 20, 22,
23,28,29,32.
135. La Follette, 450 U.S. at 120-26.
136. Thus, the Petitioners admitted that "states have broad regulatory power over the conduct of
election." Petitioners' Brief at 22. They also allowed that "[t]he State certainly has wide latitude to
regulate elections to ensure that they are fair and honest." Id. at 39.
The Respondents argued that "[t]he State's power to regulate elections for public office is a
fundamental attribute of the State's sovereignty and its democratic character." Respondents' Brief at.
15-17 (quote taken from argument heading I.B. at 15). They also cited to cases they claimed stood for
the propositions that States may require party nominations to be determined in primary elections,
citing to Lightfoot v. Eu, 964 F.2d 865 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,507 U.S. at 919; parties may not bar
blacks from participating their primaries, citing to Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); parties
"engage[d] in the nominating process... are subject to a wide range of state regulation," citing to
Morse v. Republican Party, 517 U.S. 186 (1996), Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-58
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7
was compelled by the constitutional authority of the States to regulate elections.13

Finally, both sides agreed that the case should be decided by the Court
applying the following flexible standard:
[w]hen deciding whether a state election law violates First and Fourteenth
Amendment associational rights, we weigh the 'character and magnitude' of the
burden the State's rule imposes on those rights against the interests the State
contends justify that burden, and consider the extent to which the State's concerns
make the burden necessary. Regulations imposing severe burdens on plaintiffs'
rights must be narrowly tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser
burdens, however, trigger less exacting review, and a State's 'important regulatory
interests' will
usually be enough to justify 'reasonable, non-discriminatory
38
restrictions."

As a consequence, the bulk of the arguments presented to the Court were
concerned with whether California's blanket primary imposed severe burdens on
the parties' associational rights, 139 advanced compelling state interests,1'4 and was
narrowly tailored to advance compelling state interests. 41 But, the adversaries

also engaged in a vigorous debate over the Petitioners' assertion that a blow-byblow application of the flexible standard was not necessary because prior U.S.
Supreme Court case law applying it dictated a decision in favor of the political
parties.

142

(1978); and parties "do not have unfettered control over who can vote in primary elections," citing to
Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
See Respondents' Brief at 19.
137. "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by law make or
alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators." U.S. CONST., art. I, § 4, c. 1. As
to the power of States to regulate state elections, the U.S. Supreme Court observed in Tashjianthat the
States' power to regulate federal elections under the Constitution "is matched by state control over the
election process for state offices." 479 U.S. at 217.
138. Petitioners' Brief at 23, and Respondents' Brief at 24, citing to Timmons v. Twin Cities Area
New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358.
139. See Petitioners' Brief at 23-38, presenting arguments that "Proposition 198 is a severe burden on
party associational rights because it forces a political party to open its nominating procedure to voters
who have absolutely no affiliation with the party." Id. at 23 (quoting argument heading II). See
Respondents' Brief at 26-38, presenting arguments that "the political parties assert burdens that are
insubstantial or speculative." Id. at 26 (quoting argument heading I.A.).
140. See Petitioners' Brief at 38-42, presenting arguments that amount to an assertion that "the
State's interests... reduce down to several which are speculative and one - the desire to produce more
'mainstream' or 'moderate' candidates - which is fundamentally at odds with the First Amendment
Rights of each political party to choose a representative which best represents the ideological views of
the party, as defined by the party." Id. at 41-42. See Respondents' Brief at 38-47, presenting arguments
that "the blanket primary advances compelling state interests." Id. at 38 (quoting argument heading
III.B.).
141. See Petitioners' Brief at 40-41, presenting arguments that there are less restrictive means than
blanket primaries for increasing voter participation and preserving voter privacy. See Respondents'
Brief at 47-50, presenting arguments that "the blanket primary is narrowly tailored to advance the
State's compelling interests." Id. at 47 (quoting argument heading III.C.).
142. See Petitioners' Brief at 19-26, presenting arguments that "a party's right to define its
membership and to choose its own nominees is a basic freedom of association protected by the First
Amendment," Id. at 19 (quoting part of argument heading I), and "Tashjian controls the result here."
Id., at 23 (quoting argument heading II.A.). See Respondents' Brief at 20-23, presenting arguments
that "the cases cited by the political parties do not support their theory of an absolute right to restrict
who can vote in selecting candidates for public office." Id. at 17 (quoting argument heading II.B.).
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C.

The Debate Over the Existence of Controlling Case Law

The Petitioners argued that California's blanket primary could not be
reconciled with the prior cases recognizing the associational rights of political
parties, because it forced parties to allow persons unaffiliated with them to
participate in their nominating processes. 43 This argument sprung from the
premise articulated in La Follette that "the freedom to associate 'necessarily
presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association,
and to limit association to those people only,'... because 'the exclusion of persons
'1
unaffiliated with a political party may seriously distort its collective decisions." "
The Petitioners tied La Follette's premise to the nominating process through Eu,
which they contended stood for the proposition that the First Amendment
protects the political parties' "right to choose a standard bearer who best
represents the party's ideologies and preferences."' 145
Seeking a knockout blow, the Petitioners' asserted that Tashjian controlled
the outcome of this case. 146 Like Jones, Tashjian involved a State primary law in
conflict with a party's nominating rules. But, Tashjian was in some ways the polar
opposite of Jones, because it involved a conflict between Connecticut's closed
primary statute and the Connecticut Republic Party's desire to permit
independent voters to vote in its primary elections.147 Still, Petitioners found
Tashjian to be controlling because in it "[t]he Court observed that '[t]he Party's
determination of the boundaries of its own association, and of the structure which
best allows it to pursue its political goals, is protected by the Constitution,', 148 and
held that:
[t]he closed primary law trenched on the party's associational rights by plac[ing]
limits upon the group of registered voters whom the Party may invite to participate
in the 'basic function' of selecting the Party's candidates. The State thus limits the
Party's associational opportunities at the crucial juncture at which the appeal to
common principles may be translated into concerted action, and hence to political
power in the community. 49
To the Petitioners, this holding sealed the fate of California's blanket primary
without the necessity to discuss in detail the burdens it imposed on political parties
or the State interests it served.5 0 They even had the audacity to suggest that:

143. See Petitioners' Brief at 23.
144. Id. at 21-22, (quoting La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122).
145. Id. at 21-22, citing to Eu, 489 U.S. at 224, wherein the Court stated that "a political party has a
right to... select 'a standard bearer who bests represents the party's ideologies and preferences'
(quoting Ripon Society, Inc. v. National Republican Party, 525 F2d 567, 601 (1975) (Tamm, J.,
concurring in result), cert. denied,424 U.S. 933, 96 S.Ct. 1147, 47 L.Ed.2d 341 (1976)).
146. See Petitioners' Brief at 23-26.
147. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 211-13. Petitioners' acknowledged this difference, Petitioners' Brief at 23,
24, and discussed its significance. Id. at 26.
148. Petitioners' Brief at 24 (citing to and quoting from Tashjian,479 U.S. at 224).
149. Id. (citing to and quoting from Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215-16).
150. In this regard, the Petitioners asserted that "[t]here is nothing peculiar to California's parties
that would make them less entitled than Connecticut parties to protection of their associational rights
at the time of nominating their candidates.... [n]or is there anything peculiar to California about the
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the associational right asserted [in Jones is] ... much stronger than the right asserted
in Tashjian... [because the California political parties sought] to choose their own
nominees [by] limit[ing] the nominating process to those who have affiliated with a
party... [while] the Connecticut Republican Party sought to allow outsiders to join
in the nomination process.151
Respondents countered the Petitioners' assertion that the outcome of Jones
is controlled by prior case law with an analysis of the significant factual differences
among Jones, Tashjian, Eu, and La Follette.i 2 Attacking Tashjian first, the
Respondents characterized the associational interest it established "as one against
having the party's electoral base restricted contrary to the party's wishes," rather
than "a sweeping right to control who may vote in primaries. ' 153 In so doing, the
Respondents pointed out that the Connecticut legislature that insisted on having
closed primaries was controlled by the Democratic Party.'5 In that light, they
reformulated the question considered in Tashjian as being "whether Democrats
could act through the State to bar Republicans from expanding their electoral
base .... ",55
Turning to Eu, the Respondents observed that the statute at issue there
"prohibit[ed] parties from endorsing candidates in primaries ... , [and therefore]
the case did not involve who could vote in primaries, but only whether parties
could speak to their members .... 1,, 6 How a party speaks to its members is an
internal matter, so the Respondents argued that Eu does not control Jones since in
Eu "the Court noted that a party's interest in controlling its internal organization
was much different from and
stronger than the party interests at stake in the
1' 57
primary election in Tashjian.
Finally, the Respondents distinguished La Follette on the basis that the issue
it resolved was whether State presidential primary laws or national party rules
govern the selection of delegates to a presidential nominating convention, "not
whether a State may choose a particular primary system over a political party's
objection."' 58 This issue, said the Respondents, "rests heavily on the special
nature of national party conventions, which... implicate interests beyond the
reach of any individual state, and reflect the need for national uniformity in our
one single national race."15 9 Moreover, the Respondents pointed out that "La
Follette did not overturn Wisconsin's open primary law... "60 [but instead]
acknowledged [that] Wisconsin has a substantial interest in the manner in which
its elections are conducted... that was not incompatible with the national party's
numerous state interests allegedly served by the blanket primary." Petitioners' Brief at 25.
151. MLat26.
152. Respondents' Brief at 20-25.
153. Id. at 21.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 22.
157. Id. at 22 (citing to Eu, 489 U.S. at 230).
158. Respondents' Brief at 22-23.
159. Id. at 23.
160. Id. at 23 (citing to La Follette, 450 U.S. at 120).
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D. The Debate Over Burdens
The essence of the Petitioners' burdens argument was that California's
blanket primary "is the nominating process most intrusive into party associational
rights because it denies the very existence of those rights." 162 To drive this point
home, the Petitioners set up a side-by-side comparison of their definition of the
party's 1associational
rights at issue and key wording from Proposition 198, as
follows: 63
The Constitutionally Protected Right: Proposition 198: The voter registration
"[T]he [party], and not someone else, card shall inform the affiant that.., all
has the right to select the [party's] properly registered voters may vote for
'standard bearer."' Timmons, 520 U.S. their choice at any primary election for
at 359.
any candidate for each office regardless
of political affiliation and without a
declaration of political faith or
allegiance.
CAL. ELEC. CODE §

2151 (emphasis

added)
This comparison, said the Petitioners, reveals that "Proposition 198 is not a slight
restraint, it is not a minor imposition, it is not a glancing blow. It is a full-scale,
head-on, point-blank assault."'164
Respondents cited expert opinion and empirical evidence to demonstrate
that in practice cross-over voting 165 allowed by blanket primaries was rarely
engaged in by improperly-motivated persons' 66 or decisive to the outcome of
elections. 167 Obviously, the implication of this information was that crossover
voting did not severely harm the associational rights of political parties. 16s
Petitioners sought to blunt this implication by arguing that it was probable that at
sometime cross-over voters would decide the outcome of a primary, and this
probability was itself a severe burden on the political parties' associational

161. Id. at 23 (citing to La Follette, 450 U.S. at 126).
162. Petitioners' Brief at 33.

163. The columns reproduced below are taken verbatim from Petitioners' Brief at 27.
164. Petitioners' Brief at 27.

165. Crossover voter was defined as "one who votes for a candidate of a party in which the voter is
not registered, [which means] the cross-over voter could be an independent voter or one who is
registered to a competing political party." DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1297.
166. See Respondents' Brief at 27-30, especially n.7 at 27-28, where improper motive is described as
voters of one party voting in the primary of another party for persons they believed would be the
weakest general election candidates.

167. See Respondents' Brief at 30.
168. See id. at 27-30.
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rights. 169
Petitioners strongly proclaimed that Proposition 198's purpose to
"produc[e] more moderate candidates" is an illegitimate legislative goal.
Decrying the prediction that more moderate candidates may indeed be produced
by blanket primaries, the Petitioners asserted that "a constitution that holds that
'[t]he independent expression of a political party's views is 'core' First Amendment
Activity' does not permit California to force upon a party a nominating process
that robs it of that independence,"' 170 for "[a]ny other conclusion raises the
troubling specter of state-run parties."'171
Finally, Petitioners alleged that the blanket primary would impose
particularly severe impacts on minor parties. To the Petitioners, minor "parties
are explicitly ideological[,] ... outside the mainstream of American politics,
[and] ...see no significant difference between the two major parties."' 72 Thus, the
Petitioners praised the minor parties for "play[ing] an important part in a
democracy" by expressing "'political ideas [that] cannot and should not be
channeled into the programs of our two major parties ...[and which historically
have often been] ultimately accepted."' 73 Demonstrating that in the 1998 primary
the total vote for each of three minority party candidates was more than twice the
party's registration in the relevant district, 74 Petitioners expressed the fear that
California, by permitting persons registered with the major parties to vote in the
minor parties' primaries, had "take[n] a major step toward stifling the voices of
minor parties. ' 75
Taking a much more empirical approach, the Respondents cited data, or the
absence of it, to support their contention that the political parties' had asserted
burdens "that are insubstantial or speculative."' 76

They first attacked the

allegation that cross-over voting would harm the parties.' 77 According to them,
the most harmful cross-over voting would be done by raiders-persons "who
mischievously (sic) switch[ ] sides to vote for the candidate perceived weakest in
another party.' ', 7 There was, they said, no empirical evidence that raiding will be

169. See Petitioners' Brief at 28, emphasizing that no matter what the strength or motive of the cross-

over vote, the parties' core associational rights will be severely harmed because "non-party members
[will] play a role, on occasion a decisive role, in choosing a party's nominee."
170. Id. at 33 (citing Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n,

518 U.S. 604,616 (1996)).
171. Petitioners' Brief at 33.

172. Id. at 33-34.
173. Id. at 37 (citing to Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,251 (1957)).
174. There were 159,307 votes cast in the Peace & Freedom Party's Insurance Commissioner

Primary, but the Peace & Freedom Party had only 71,620 registered voters eligible to vote for that
office. See Petitioner's Brief at 36. Similarly, 4,333 votes were cast in the Libertarian Party's First
District Congressional Primary, but only 1,939 persons were registered as Libertarians in that district.
Id. at 37. Finally, 3,469 votes were cast in the Libertarian Party's 77th District Assembly Primary, but
only 1,294 persons were registered as Libertarians in the 77th District. Id.
175. Petitioners' Brief at 38.
176. Respondents' Brief at 26-38 (quote taken from argument heading III.A. on 26).

177. See idat 27-31.
178. Id. at27.
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a factor in any California race. 179 Respondents then cited the parties' own experts
for the proposition that "90 to 95 percent of crossover voters are voting for the
candidate of their choice,"' ° and characterized such voters as having "no intent to
create mischief."1' 81 Moreover, they contended that "crossover voting makes little
difference if it does not change the outcome of the election, ' 182 and the evidence
183
showed that crossover voting generally does change election outcomes.
Curiously, the Respondents claimed that crossover voting in open and closed
primaries do more damage to parties than it does in blanket primaries.'84
According to this claim, many voters become so attracted to a candidate of a party
with which they are unaffiliated that they find a way to be able to vote for him or
her in the primary election185 Such voters are then "locked into the other party's
ballot for all other races, ' 186 causing them to face a "choice of not voting, voting
for candidates about whom they have no knowledge or interest, or voting
mischievously. ' 187 Having theorized that crossover voting potentially damaging to
parties occurs in open and closed primaries, the Respondents' warned that "the
consequence of accepting the political parties' arguments on crossover voting
'
jeopardizes almost all forms of primaries currently in use."' 8
Under the heading "Proposition 198 does not burden parties' traditional
activities," the Respondents characterized as "speculative at best and not
substantial in any case" certain burdens the political parties had raised during the
District Court proceedings but had not pressed on appeal."'8 9 These burdens were
2
9
allegedly on internal party governance, 19° party discipline,' 1campaign activities,'

179. See id at 28. Indeed, the Respondents cited expert findings that successful raiding is all but
impossible to achieve because "(1) the raider's own primary must be uncontested; (2) the race in the
opposing party must be tightly contested; (3) the raider must be able to tell which candidate in the
target party will be weakest in the general election; and (4) the raider must be part of a concerted
action." Id. at 27-28 n.7. Given these conditions, the experts "concluded that less than 2 percent of
voters ever engage in raiding" and that the lack of information on the day of the primary as to who will
be the weakest on general election day makes successful raiding all but impossible. Id.
180. Respondents' Brief at 29-30.
181. Id. at 30.
182- Id.
183. See id. To that end, Respondents noted that the political "parties had cited only three races in
the past 60 years under the Alaska and Washington blanket primaries which arguably were determined
by crossover voting .... " Id. at 30 n.9.
184. See id at 30-31. The Respondents believed this crossover voting would occur because of the
tendency of open primary states and some closed primary states to provide for same-day registration at
the primary election polls that permitted voters to receive the primary ballot of any party, "whether or
not the voter previously has registered as a member of that party .... Id. at 30-32 (citation omitted).
185. See id at 30.
186. Respondents' Brief at 31.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 31-33. The primaries referred to include those "in states where voter registration is not
required or recorded, and in... states where the voter may request any ballot on the day of the
primary..., [which enables] any voter... [to] obtain any party's ballot on the day of the primary and
'switch' parties, or cross over, with ease." Id. at 33.
189. Id at 33-36 (quoted part at 33).
190. See id. at 34.
191. See id.
192. See Respondents' Brief at 35.
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protecting the party from false candidates,1' 9 and defining party membership.
At the District Court, the parties had complained that nominees elected with
outside support under the blanket primary system would adulterate their parties'
governing bodies because the parties "permit[ted] their nominees to serve on and
make appointments to their central committees."1' 95 Respondents' refuted this
complaint by noting that:
[(1)] all nominees and their appointees must be members of the party[; (2)] ...

nothing prevents the parties from changing how their central committees are
constituted[; (3)] ... nothing suggests that nominees who win crossover votes will be
less dedicated to party ideals and activities[; and (4)] this scenario exists in closed

also receive the nomination with less than
primaries... where a candidate can 196
majority support from party members.

Most tellingly, the Respondents noted that party rules give party officeholders
"more appointments to the central committee in recognitionof their demonstrated
ability to appeal across party lines[,]"'197 thereby insinuating that the parties' fears
that California's blanket primary would lead to the adulteration of their central
committees was insincere.19

The parties had expressed concern that under the blanket primary
officeholders would be more likely to "break from the parties' positions on
issues." 199 On appeal, the Respondents asserted that "[t]his is a harm only if the
party has a greater claim to the candidates than do the constituents. ' '2°° More
practically, the Respondents pointed out that party discipline is a problem even
under closed primary systems, because "many elected officials, especially those
from competitive districts, vote[ ] against their party leadership." 20 1
Respondents claimed that Proposition 198 did not affect party campaign
activities. Blanket primaries, they said, still let parties "develop platforms, register
new voters, endorse candidates, provide financial support, and conduct get-outthe-vote activities .... 202
Respondents also listed many protections available to keep parties from
being victimized by the nomination of "'false candidates' who will carry the party's
label but not its politics." These protections included the requirement that party
candidates be party members, 2°3 the ability of parties to endorse preferred

193. See id.
194. See id. at 35-36.
195. DistrictJones, 984 F.Supp. at 1299.
196. Respondents' Brief at 34.
197. Id.
198. See id.
199. Respondent's Brief at 34.
200. Id. at 34. They also contended that "the balance struck between party caucus discipline and
permitting legislators to 'vote their districts' is a question of public policy and it is not a function of any
court to resolve them [sic]." Id.
201. Id. at 34.
202. Id. at 35.
203. See id.
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candidates, and the power of parties to impose certain tests on those who would
run under their banners.20
The membership definition issue was essentially labeled a "red herring" by
the Respondents. As they pointed out, "[i]n California, both before and after
Proposition 198, citizens become members of parties simply by registering to vote
as members of [their preferred] party."2 6
Finally, the Respondents sought to refute the Petitioners' claim that
California's blanket primary especially burdened minor parties. 207 To that end,
they asserted that "[t]he interest minor parties have in elections is largely an
expressive one," presumably because their candidates have little chance to win.
Respondents then proclaimed that "expressive interests.., fail to rise to the level
of protected associational interests in elections... [because 'b]allots serve
primarily to elect candidates, not as fora for political expression.
E.

The Debate Over The Existence of Compelling State Interests

For litigation purposes, the Respondents characterized the "ending partisan
gridlock" and "rescuing voters from disenfranchisement" election campaign
themes of Proposition 198's proponents21 as compelling state interests. 21 They
also alleged that the State had a compelling interest in three other purported
effects of a blanket primary: expanding
the debate, protecting voter privacy,213
214
fairness.
electoral
and promoting
Respondents reformulated the partisan gridlock argument by asserting that
"[t]he blanket primary aims not to produce more 'moderate' candidates, but
rather candidates who are more representative of the electorate.,215 They then

204. See id.
205. See Respondents' Brief at 35 (citing to Duke v. Smith, 13 F.3d 388,391 n.3 (11th Cir. 1994)).
206. Id. at 35.
207. See id. at 36-38.
208. Id. at 37.
209. Id. at 36-37, citing to and quoting Timmons, 520 U.S. at 363.
210. See discussion of the Proposition 198 campaign themes at supranote 77 and accompanying text
at 65-66.
211. Respondents argued that ending partisan gridlock was a compelling state interest under the
headings of The Blanket PrimaryWill Produce Elected Officials Who Better Represent the Electorate,
Respondents' Brief at 39-42 (quoted heading at 39), and The Blanket PrimaryAffords Voters More
Choice. Respondents' Brief at 42-43 (quoted heading at 42). Respondents argued that the State has a
compelling interest in protecting voters from disenfranchisement under the headings of The Blanket
PrimaryProvides An Effective Vote to DisenfranchisedVoters, Respondents' Brief at 43-45 (quoted
heading at 43), and The Blanket Primary Increases Voter Participation. Respondents' Brief at 45-46
(quoted heading at 45).
212. See Respondents' Brief at 46, under the heading of The Blanket PrimaryExpands Debate.
213. See Respondents' Brief at 47, under the heading of The Blanket PrimaryProtectsVoter Privacy.
214. See Respondents' Brief at 47, under the heading of The Blanket PrimaryPromotesFairness.
215. Respondents' Brief at 41-42. In this respect, Respondents argued that "'reflective' and
'moderate' are not synonymous. The political parties' own experts pointed to numerous candidates
who benefited from crossover voting who are not 'moderates': George Wallace, Eugene McCarthy,
Gary Hart, Ronald Reagan, and Jerry Brown." Id. at 42. Nevertheless, Respondents admitted that
"the more representative candidate will often appear the more moderate," because "most of the
electorate lies near the center of the ideological spectrum." Id.
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argued that three benefits in which States have compelling interests would flow
from this effect: (1) "elections [will] effectively translate the will of the
electorate,, 216 (2) the integrity of the electoral process will be promoted by
reducing the risks that "voter[s will] stagger[ ] from election to election picking
between candidates who do not reflect... [their] views,, 2 17 and (3) "more
representative 'problem solvers' who are less beholden to party officials and
'special interest groups... will be elected.218 According to the Respondents, the
greater reflectiveness of the officeholders would flow from another policy
promoted by the blanket primary-affording general election voters more
acceptable choices by enabling "'every [primary] voter to select the best candidate
for each office, regardless of party affiliation."' 219 In this regard, Respondents
rejected the Petitioners' charge that blanket primaries would reduce meaningful
choice by narrowing the ideological differences between general election
candidates, asserting that "[t]he parties[ ] ... mistakenly take[ ] the distance
between candidates themselves, not the candidates' closeness to the voters, as the
measure of a healthy political system."
Revealing a xenophobic streak, the
Respondents grumped that "this view of 'meaningful choice' reflects a European,
not an American, model." 22'
Respondents largely reasserted the disenfranchisement arguments-that
closed primaries disenfranchise independent voters, voters living in safe districts
who are not members of the dominant party, and disaffected voters-made by the
Proposition 198 proponents during the initiative election. 2 The substantive basis
for these arguments is that the State has a compelling interest in providing all
voters the opportunity to "have a meaningful say in who represents them without
also forcing them to abandon their political affiliation."' ' 3 To buttress these
arguments, the Respondent presented evidence showing that in California the
percent of independent voters had increased from 11 to 14,224 the percent of
voters living in a safe district who were not affiliated with the dominant party was

216. Respondents' Brief at 39 (citing Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 732 (1974), for the proposition
that "the state may regulate the election process to assure that elections effectively translate the will of
the electorate").

Respondents buttressed this argument by citing cases they assert permit "[tihe

State... [to] insist that candidates demonstrate a significant level of support before qualifying for the
general election." Respondents' Brief at 39-40 (citing to American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S.
767, 782 (1973); Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 442 (1971).
217. Id. at 40 (citing to Rosario v. Rockerfeller, 410 U.S. 752, 761 (1973), for the proposition that
"the state has a valid interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process").
218. Respondents' Brief at 41.
219. Id. at 42 (quoting from the ballot pamphlet used during the initiative election).
220. Respondents' Brief at 41.
221. Id. at 41 (emphasis added) (citing to "concessions" allegedly made by the political parties
experts).
222. See id. at 43-46, where these arguments are presented under the headings of The Blanket
Primary Provides An Effective Vote to Disenfranchised Voters and The Blanket Primary Increases
Voter Participation. The disenfranchisement arguments of Proposition 198 proponents are presented
at supranote 77, and accompanying text at 66-67.
223. Id. at 44.
224. See id, at 43-44.
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about 25,m and voter participation in primary elections had increased
dramatically in the two primary elections held since the blanket primary went into
effect. 226 They also cited empirical evidence "that other blanket primary states
exhibited the highest levels of turnout, open primary states the next highest levels,
and closed primaries the lowest turnout."
Finally, the Respondents added three new window-dressing policy
arguments to their defense of blanket primaries. First, they asserted that blanket
primaries "expand debate beyond the narrow scope of partisan concerns," by
"compel[ling] candidates to appeal to a larger segment of the electorate."
Second, taking their cue from the State of Washington, the Respondents argued
that blanket primaries protect voter privacy by ending the publicizing of voters'
party affiliations that could expose them to hostility.29 Third, they reiterated the
District Court's finding that "'voters of California believe the [electoral] system is
fairer when all voters... may participate in framing the choice of candidates at
the general election,"' 23 and its holding that "[t]he voters' belief in the fairness of
the electoral process is itself a 'substantial state interest. ' 231
The Petitioners charged that "the State's interests.., reduce down to several
which are speculative and one - the desire to produce more 'mainstream' or
'moderate' candidates - which is fundamentally at odds with the First Amendment
rights of each political party.... 232 Accordingly, after equating reflective
candidates with moderate candidates, 33 they insisted that "[p]ursuing moderation
in party nominations is not a legitimate state interest[, because it violates the] ...
parties['] associational rights... to choose the standard bearer that best represents
[their] ideolog[ies]." 234
Petitioners insisted that no registered voter in California is disenfranchised
because "all registered voters in California can vote in the general election, and all
can choose to affiliate with a party and then participate in that party's primary
election." 235 Thus, they concluded that "if [voters] find themselves unable to vote

225. See id. at 44.

226. See Respondents' Brief at 45. "In fact, in the March 2000 election, California experienced the
highest voter turn-out in a primary election in 20 years," whereas in "the thirty years prior to the
blanket primary's adoption, California had witnessed a 15-20 percent decline in voter participation in
both primary and general elections." Id.

227. Id- at 46.
228. Id. To support this argument, the Respondents noted that during the 1998 California
gubernatorial election, "the virtually unchallenged Republican Candidate ... participated in
unprecedented debates with the three principal contenders for the Democratic nomination," and that a
Democratic state senator had complained that the "blanket primary would require Democrats to

'reopen' discussion of abortion." Id.
229. See id. at 47 (citing to Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215 n.5,, for the proposition that publication of
voters' party affiliations expose voters to hostility, and Heavey, 611 P.2d 1256, 1259 (1980), for the
general proposition that blanket primaries protect voter privacy).
230. Id. at 47 (quoting from Jones District,984 F.Supp. at 1303).
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Petitioners' Brief at 41-42.
See id. at 38.
Id. at 38-39 (citing to Eu, 489 U.S. at 224).
Id. at 40.
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in a particular party primary, it is the result of their own decision. '' 236 Contending
that "[t]he very concept of a political party presupposes the- exclusion of those
who do not share [its] interests...[,]"3 7 the petitioners proclaimed that the effort
to enhance certain voters' franchise through "a blanket primary law... run[s]
head-on into the First Amendment."
Finally, the Petitioners dismissed the States' interests in increasing voter
participation, broadening the debate on public issues, and preserving voter privacy
on grounds that there is little or no evidence that they will be promoted by a
blanket primary. To that end, they stated that any assertion that a blanket
primary will increase voter turnout "is simply a predictive judgement."' 239 As to
broadening the debate, they pointed out that "'many informed observers lament
the lack of distinct choices in American politics and feel that the system shuts out
legitimate points of view that do not fall in the middle of the ideological
spectrum. ' '' 24 0 Noting that there was "no mention of... [preserving voter privacy]
in the ballot pamphlet[,]" and that "[t]here is ... no evidence.., that invasions of

voter privacy have been a problem in California[,]" the Petitioners dismissed
California's interest in voter privacy as "post-hoc rationalization." 24'
F.

The TailoringDebate

In reliance on the District Court's finding that "the fundamental goal of
enhancing representativeness by providing all voters with a choice that is not
predetermined by party members alone can only be advanced by the blanket
primary," the Respondents claimed that the fit between this goal and the blanket
primary was perfect. 242 Respondents buttressed this claim by pointing out that in
other flexible primaries - open, semi-closed, and closed with same day registration
- "voters must still forfeit their desired
political affiliation or forego effective
' 243
participation in the democratic process.
The Petitioners did not raise the tailoring issue with respect to the State's
interests in producing reflective candidates and providing a voice to
disenfranchised voters, choosing instead to rely on their arguments that these
interests were either unconstitutional intrusions on the associational rights of
political parties,244 or non-existent. 245 They proclaimed that the voter privacy
236. Id. To support their disenfranchisement arguments, Petitioners cited Nader v. Schaffer, 417 F.

Supp. 837, 847 (D. Conn. 1976), affd, 429 U.S. 989 (1976), for the proposition that "requiring party
enrollment before voting in partisan primary is not an absolute barrier to voting." Id. (quoting from

Petitioners' Brief).
237. Petitioners' Brief at 40.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 41 (citing to expert opinion).

241. Id.
242. Respondents' Brief at 47-48 (citing to and quoting DistrictJones, 984 F.Supp. at 1303).

243. IaMat 48 (citations omitted).
244. See Petitioners' Brief at 38-39, (arguing that the goal of producing more reflective candidates

destroyed the parties' associational rights to choose their own standard bearers); Respondents' Brief at
40, (arguing that the goal of giving voice to disenfranchised voters "run[s] head-on into the First
Amendment").
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interest was also non-existent,2 4 but further argued that voter privacy could be
protected by less restrictive means such as minimizing public access to voter
registration records.247 Petitioners also insisted that there were more narrowly
tailored and less restrictive means available for increasing voter participation, such
as "allowing registration closer to the date of the primary." 243 Finally, the
Petitioners alleged that the blanket primary would narrow rather than broaden
the debate.24 9
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE JONES DECISIONS
A.

Posture of the Case On Arrival At the Supreme Court

As the briefs in Jones arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court, Respondents must
have felt good about their chances of winning. The blanket primary had been
judicially reviewed three times by state supreme courts, twice in Washington and
once in Alaska, and each time had survived vigorous constitutional challenges.2 0
In 1997, the year the Respondents prevailed in Federal District Court, the U.S.
Supreme Court declined to review the Washington Supreme Court's decision
upholding Washington's blanket primary251
More importantly, the Respondents had successfully defended California's
blanket primary in Federal District Court and the Federal Court of Appeals. 2
District Judge Levi's opinion, which was adopted verbatim by the Court of
Appeals,s 3 strongly upheld the Respondents' positions on all major issues.
Judge Levi blocked the political parties' attempted knockout blow by
rejecting their contentions that their associational rights entitled them to exclude
non-members from their candidate nomination procedures "no matter what the
State's interest and no matter how Proposition 198 will work in practice."''
Key
determinants of this holding included Judge Levi's concerns that accepting the
parties' position would:
245. See Petitioners' Brief at 39-40 (arguing that the blanket primary does not help disenfranchised

voters because no California voter is disenfranchised).
246. See id at 41 (arguing that there did not exist any proof that voter privacy was a problem in
California).
247. See id at 41.
248. Id. at 40, where petitioners also quoted one expert as saying "if you were looking for the best
tool to increase turnout this [the blanket primary] is not what you would pick."
249. See id at 41.
250. The Washington Supreme Court had upheld the blanket primary twice Heavey v. Chapman, 611
P.2d 1256 (1980); Anderson v. Millikin, 59 P.2d 295 (1936). Alaska's Supreme Court had upheld the
blanket primary in 1996. O'Callaghan v. State of Alaska, 914 P.2d 1250 (Alaska 1996), cert. denied
sub. nom, Republican Party of Alaska v. O'Callahan, 520 U.S. 1209 (1997).
251. See Republican Party of Alaska v. O'Callahan, 520 U.S. 1209 (1997).
252. See DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. 1288 (E.D. Cal. 1997), affd, California Democratic Party v.
Jones, 169 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 1999).
253. See California Democratic Party v. Jones, 169 F.3d 646, 647 (9th Cir. 1999), where Appellate
Judge Fletcher stated that "[w]e have reviewed ... the careful, detailed, and eloquent opinion of the
district court. Because we concur in it in every respect, we have elected to adopt it as the opinion of
our court... [and] attach it as an appendix."
254. DistrictJones, 984 F.Supp. at 1295-97 (quote at 1295).
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> require the invalidation of the open primaries used in many states,25
>'unduly restrict States' powers
to require the use of primary elections to select
25 6
general election candidates,
> permit party member qualification rules to override State voter registration
requirements as to who can vote in primaries.2 57
Perhaps the most important determinant, however, was Judge Levi's view
that political parties should be subject to State election regulations because, unlike
private associations, they "are very like the government itself" and "perform
functions[, such as the nomination of candidates,] that are ... governmental in
nature ....253
During the District Court proceedings, the political parties predicted that the
blanket primaries would induce a great deal of cross-over voting and contended
that
the cross-over vote, and the prospect of a large cross-over vote, will affect the
selection and behavior of party nominees and elected officials; weaken party
discipline; increase the costs of primary elections by causing candidates to compete
as if it were a general election; dampen59the morale of party activists; and disrupt
internal party structure and governance.2
The District Court made findings that essentially affirmed the political parties'
belief that enough cross-over voting would take place to produce the harms they
feared. 260 Nevertheless, the District Court concluded that the burdens imposed on
255. Id. at 1295.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 1295-96. In this regard, Judge Levi expressed concern that party qualification rules could
either prevent voters from participating in primaries who were eligible to do so under State voter
registration laws, Id. at 1295, or permit persons to vote who were ineligible to vote under State voter
registration laws or who had lost their right to vote by operation of other State laws. Id. at 1295-96.
For example, Judge Levi noted that the California Libertarian Party recognizes as members only
persons who "pay dues and sign a pledge [of nonviolence]," Id. at 1295 n.18, and "the Peace and
Freedom Party confers party membership on persons who are 'deprived of the right to vote by the
State of California because of age, citizenship, or prior social behavior."' Id. Most dramatically, Judge
Levi cited the "White Primary Cases", wherein the U.S. Supreme Court had upheld the government's
power to prohibit parties from denying persons the opportunity to participate in their candidate
selection processes on account of race or ethnicity, to negate the idea that party membership rules
should control who can participate in the selection of party general election candidates. Id. (citing
Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)).
258. DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1296.
259. Id. at 1297.
260. The Court found that "[t]he experience in Washington suggests that as to the election for any
particular office, approximately 10% of the voters are cross-over voters, excluding independents, while
in some.., cases this figure may rise as high as 20-25%." Id. at 1298. With respect to whether crossover votes would decide elections, the Court found that:
Given that in Washington, cross-over rates occasionally reach levels as high as 20-25%, and
that the crossover rate in California could be higher than Washington, it is likely that in the
fullness of time some California primary races will be decided by cross-over voters, even if
the number of such occasions is not large. Depending on the circumstances, the swing of
even one seat could give a legislative majority to one party.
Id. at 1299. As to whether blanket primaries would affect candidate and officeholder behavior and the
costs of campaigns, the Court found that
Candidates will perceive a need or opportunity to attract support from the entire electorate,
not simply from members of their respective parties. This will affect not only the cost of the
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the parties associational rights by California's blanket primary were significant but
not severe. 26' This conclusion stemmed in part from the Court's finding that,
despite the negative consequences of the blanket primary on their associational
rights, the major parties "continue to be strong political parties in [the State of]
Washington. 262 It also apparently stemmed from the Court's beliefs that "in the
typical election, the cross-over vote will not be decisive,"2' 63 and "the major
political parties lack the unity of purpose and cohesive membership characteristic
of most private organizations." 264
Judge Levi made findings that largely affirmed the Respondents' assertions
that the blanket primary would advance a number of State interests.265 These
interests included: extending the primary election franchise to disenfranchised
voters (independents and persons living in safe districts who are unaffiliated with
the dominate party),266 reducing partisanship among elected officials by reducing
the influence of party members in selecting major party nominees, 267 increasing
voter turnout, 2M increasing the competitiveness of elections, 269 and protecting
voter privacy.270 Although Judge Levi merely recited the Respondents' offers of
evidence supporting their disenfranchisement and privacy assertions,271 he
expressly found that blanket primaries would improve the representativeness of
elected officials. 2 Noting that "[t]urnout rates in blanket primary states have
been higher than in California," 27 3 Judge Levi opined that "there is reason to
expect that by providing more choice, the blanket primary may encourage more
voters to participate at the primary election." z 4 As to whether the blanket
primary would increase competitiveness of elections, Judge Levi found "there
primary-which is likely to increase... - but may affect the positions that candidates take
on political issues as they seek to attract cross-over voters.

Id. As a consequence, said the Court, "A blanket or open primary weakens the 'disciplining effect' of
the primary challenge in requiring 'the officeholder [to] carry out the party philosophy and support the

majority position of the party caucus."' Id. (citation omitted). Finally, the Court found that "[t]he
corollary to this loss of discipline is a loss of power to party activists such that the ardor of party
volunteers and activists may be dampened in a system that permits non- party members to exert

influence over the party's selection of a candidate." Id.
261. See DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1300-01.
262. Id. at 1300.
263. Id.

264. Id. at 1296. The point of this finding is that party membership is a fluid concept that can be
changed at will without much effort, Id. n.20, even in closed primary states, Id., so that the parties'
contention that "Proposition 198 permits non-party members to vote in a party's primary... covers

over much of the imprecision in the political reality." Id. at 1296.
265. See DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1301-03.

266. See id. at 1301-02.
267. See id. at 1302.
268. See id. at 1302-03.
269. See id.
270. See id. at 1303.
271. See DistrictJones, 984 Supp. at 1301-02 (disenfranchisement), 1303 (privacy).
272. See id. at 1302. In making this finding, Judge Levi stated that "[a]lthough th[is] assertion[ ] [is]
not readily susceptible of proof, many [we]re not contested, or are supported by persuasive opinion
evidence from defendants' experts." Id.

273. Id.
274. Id.
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[wa]s reason to expect some increase in the number of candidates... [and] the
closeness of elections.. ."275 even though he had determined that "the empirical
case for th[ese] assertion[s] ... [was] not conclusive. 27 6

Based on his findings, Judge Levi held that "[t]aken as whole the State's
interests that support the blanket primary [we]re substantial, indeed
To back this holding, he quoted Storer v. Brown 7 s for the
compelling." '2
proposition that there is a "substantial state interest in encouraging compromise
and political stability, in attempting to ensure that the election winner will
represent a majority of the community." 279 Referencing FEDERALIST No. 10
(Madison) as an expression of how "factionalism... deeply troubled the framers
of the Constitution," 28uJudge Levi held that "[a] State's interest in ameliorating
'unrestrained factionalism' is a compelling one."' 81 After pronouncing that
"[i]ncreasing the representativeness of elected officials, giving voters greater
choice, and increasing voter turnout and participation in the primary processes
[we]re all interests of the first order,." he held that "[t]he voters' belief in the
fairness of the electoral process [wa]s also a substantial state interest" that was
promoted by the blanket primary. 28 In short, Judge Levi held that the blanket
primary "advances interests that are uniquely those of the State and its electorate
interests that
as opposed to the parties... [which] outweigh the also substantial
'
the political parties have in controlling who votes in the primary" 4
Judge Levi said little about the tailoring issue. Prior to making his
compelling state interests findings, he compressed all of the States' interests into
"one fundamental contention:

. . [the blanket primary] ...

enhances the

democratic nature of the election process and the representativeness of elected
officials. ' us8 True to this view of the State's interests, Judge Levi held that "the
fundamental goal of enhancing representativeness by providing all voters with a
choice that is not predetermined by party members alone can only be advanced by
the blanket primary."8 6
In effect, Judge Levi compressed the Jones controversy into a stark choice:
"the States' constitutional powers to regulate elections in a manner that "enhances
the democratic nature of the election process"' ' versus the political parties' First
Amendment rights "to choose their own nominees [by] limit[ing] the nominating

275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.

Id. at 1303.
Id.
DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1303.
415 U.S. 724 (1974).
DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1303.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1301.
Id. at 1303.
Id. at 1301.
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process to those who have affiliated with a party ....
"m This compression of the
issues was essentially ratified by the arguments made to the U.S. Supreme Court
by the Petitioners and Respondents. The Petitioners' arguments could be
summed up in two phrases:
1.
the goal of producing more moderate candidates is illegitimate because
it violates the parties' associational "right[s] to choose [the] standard
bearers that best represent[ ] [their] ideologies;289 and
2.
"[t]he very concept of a political party presupposes the exclusion of
those who do not share [its] interests ... .,290

Similarly, two phrases summed up the Respondents' views:
1.
States have a compelling interest in regulating elections so that they
will "effectively translate the will of the electorate 291 by producing
officeholders who are "more representative 'problem-solvers' ... [and]
less beholden to party officials and special interest groups; ' s292 and
2.
The State has a compelling interest in providing all voters the
opportunity to "have a meaningful say in who represents them without
' 293
also forcing them to abandon their political affiliation.
Given the Petitioners' heavy reliance on Tashjian, the compressed version of
the Jones controversy seemed to favor the Respondents. It is true that the
majority opinion in Tashjian facially supported the Petitioners by recognizing a
broad right of political parties and their members "to determine for themselves
with whom they will associate, and whose support they will seek, in their quest for
political success." 294 But, the Tashjian majority recognized this right in order to

allow the Connecticut Republican Party to escape the strictures of Connecticut's
closed primary law so it could broaden its base of support by inviting
independents to participate in its primaries.295 Thus, Tashjian enhanced the
democratic nature of the election process, for it was more concerned with helping
a party reach out to non-members than it was with controlling who may vote in
primaries. 296
Moreover, the Tashjian majority was a thin one, since it was comprised of
only five Justices.2 9 It was also an ephemeral one, since none of its members were
still on the Court last term.298 As a consequence, Tashjian's weak associational

288. Petitioners' Brief at 26.
289. Id. at 38-39.
290. Id. at 40.
291. Respondents' Brief at 39.
292. Id. at 41.
293. Id. at 44.
294. Tashjian,479 U.S. at 214.
295. IL at 212-13.
296. See Respondents' Brief at 21, making this precise argument to distinguish Tashjianfrom Jones.
297. The Tashjianmajority opinion was written by Justice Marshall, and joined by Justices Brennan,
White, Blackman and Powell. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 209.
298. The membership of the U.S. Supreme Court when Jones was decided included Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens, O'Connor, Scalla, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, Ginsburg, and Breyer.
See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2405.
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rights holding was without adherents as Jones arrived at the U.S. Supreme Court.
Better yet for the Respondents, three Justices,2 all of whom were on the
Court last term,3 joined in a dissent that seemed to give States' carte blanche in
regulating primary elections. Writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and
Madam Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia rejected flatly the Republican Party's
demand that the State honor its desire to include independents in its primaries by
stating:
[T]here is no reason why the State is bound to honor that desire - any more than it
would be bound to honor a party's democratically expressed desire that its

candidates henceforth be selected by a convention rather than a primary, or by the
party's executive committee in a smoke-filled room. [T]he validity of the state-

imposed primary requirement..., which we have hitherto considered "too plain for
argument," ... presupposes that... Connecticutmay lawfully requirethatsignificant
elements of the democratic election process be democratic - whether the Party wants
that or not.0 1

And yet, Tashjian contained warning signs indicating that it could supply
more than facial support to the Petitioners. The majority took pains to remind
readers that in cases where nonmembers had sought to participate in a party's
affairs against its will, the Court had found that the "nonmember's desire to
participate ...[wa]s overborne by the countervailing and legitimate right of the
party to determine its own membership qualifications. ' '302 More ominously, the
majority indicated that it might have taken a different view if the Republican
Party had sought "to open its primary to all voters, including members of other
parties., 30 3 This, the majority asserted, "would... [have] threaten[ed] other
parties with the disorganization effects ['of independent candidacies launched by
unsuccessful putative nominees' and cross-over voters engaged in raiding] 304 which
[restrictive] statutes... [approved by the Court in other cases] were designed to
prevent.,30 5 Furthermore, the dissenters expressed their dim view of permitting
persons unwilling to commit any act of affiliation to vote in a party's primary by

299. These Justices were Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia and O'Connor. See Tashjian,

479 U.S. at 234.
300. See DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1302.
301. Tashjian,479 U.S. at 237 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Interestingly, the dissenters also

seemed to provide support for the Respondents' suggestion that Proposition 198 was virtually adopted
by the major political parties because it received an overwhelming support from the rank-in-file

members of both parties who voted in the initiative election. Justice Scalia complained that there was

"no way of knowing that a majority of the Party's members ... favor[ed] allowing ultimate selection of
its candidates for federal and statewide office to be determined by persons outside the Party."
Tashjian,479 U.S. at 237. The Court lacked this knowledge, said Justice Scalia, because "[t]hat decision
was not made by democratic ballot, but by the Party's state convention-which... may have been

dominated by officeholders and office seekers whose ...[views] diverged significantly from... [those]
of the Party's rank-in-ffile." Id.
302. Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 216 n.6 (citing to Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752(1973); Nader v.
Schaffer, 417 F. Supp. 837 (D. Conn. 1976), affd, 429 U.S. 989(1976)).
303. Id.at 224 n.13.
304. ILd.
at 224.
305. Id. at 224 n.13 (citing to Storer, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), and Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752

(1973)).
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stating their reluctance to apply the term associational freedom to the Republican
Party's desire to "leave the selection of its candidate to persons who are not
members of the Party, and are unwilling to become members. 30 6 Thus, they
opined that "[t]he Connecticut voter who, while steadfastly refusing to register as
a Republican, casts a vote in the Republican primary, forms no more meaningful
an 'association' with the Party than does the independent or the registered
Democrat who responds to questions by a Republican Party pollster. 0 07 From all
this, one could imply that both the majority and dissenting justices in Tashjian
would have agreed that parties have a strong First Amendment right not to have
the association of nonmembers forced on them by state law.
Finally, Tashjian contained one unique factual element that could be used to
distinguish it from Jones in a manner disfavoring the Respondents. Connecticut
election laws would not permit anyone to appear as a candidate in a party's
primary who had not won at least twenty percent (20%) of the delegate vote at a
prior party convention. The Tashjian majority asserted that this requirement
would insure that the general election nominees produced by the Republicans'
open primary would have more than a little in common ideologically with the
party's members. 3° In contrast, California's blanket primary law did not permit
parties to protect themselves from "false candidates" by using conventions to limit
which candidates could claim affiliation with them on primary election ballots.
La Follette was the only other case heavily relied on by the Petitioners that
involved a direct conflict between state election laws and party nomination rules.
In La Follette, the Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute requiring delegates to the
Democratic Party's National Convention to cast votes for Democratic Party
presidential candidates in proportion to the votes they received in Wisconsin's
open presidential primary.309 Relying on Cousins v. Wigoda,310 in which the Court
invalidated an Illinois court order requiring the Democratic National Convention
to seat Illinois delegates chosen in violation of the Democratic Party's rules,311 the
Court held that national parties have the associational right to limit who may
"participate in their processes leading to the selection of delegates to their
National Convention., 312 In doing so, the Court refused to consider Wisconsin's
burden argument, stating that "a State, or a court, may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the Party [because a] political party's choice among the
various ways of determining the make up of a State's delegation to the party's
national convention is protected by the Constitution., 313 It also found the
interests cited as compelling by the State - "preserving the overall integrity of the
electoral process, providing secrecy of the ballot, increasing voter participation in
306. Id. at 235 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
307. Id.at 235 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
308. Tashjian,479 U.S. at 220-21.
309. La Follette, 450 U.S at 110-12.

310.
311.
312.
313.

419 U.S. 477 (1975).
See Cousins, 419 U.S. at 483, 487.
La Follette, 450 U.S at 121-22.
Id. at 123-24.
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primaries, and preventing harassment of voters" - were not served by the
"imposition of voting requirements upon those who ... are eventually selected as
delegates., 314 Nevertheless, as the Respondents pointed out in their brief,3 5 La
Follette's strong support for the associational rights of political parties was
provided "in the context of the selection of delegates to the National Party," 31 6 and
therefore did not concern the constitutionality of the "'open' feature of the state
primary election law as such. 31
Arguably, then, La Follette should not be
relevant to the question of whether States' can force political parties to nominate
candidates for public offices through primaries in which nonmembers are allowed
to participate.
Four other cases seemed to support the Petitioners' side of the Jones
controversy. Two, Storer v. Brown,3 18 and Rosario v. Rockefeller,1 imposed
limitations on the flexibility of candidates and voters to participate in elections
after changing party affiliations in order to promote the States' compelling interest
in "preserv[ing]... the integrity of the electoral process." 320 Two others,
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FederalElection Comm'n,32'
and Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee,3 struck down
statutes the Court felt violated the free speech and free association rights of
political parties. 323
In Storer, the Court upheld a California statute requiring that persons
wishing to be included on general election ballots as independent candidates must
be disaffiliated from all parties a year before the primaries are held for the offices
they seek.324 The Court upheld this statute in part because it found that it served
California's compelling interest in protecting the "stability of its political system"
from damage caused by "splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism." 325 The
statute served this purpose, according to the Court, by forcing the "contending
forces within [each] party [to] employ the primary campaign and primary election
to finally settle their differences," thereby insuring that the general election "is not
a forum for continuing intraparty feuds., 32 6 This vision of the purpose of primary
elections was vigorously advocated by the Petitioners. 327

314. Id. at 124-25.
315. Respondents' Brief at 22-23.
316. La Follette,450 U.S at 121.
317. Id. at 120-21.
318. 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
319. 410 U.S. 752 (1973).
320. Rosario, 410 U.S. at 761; accord,Storer, 415 U.S. at 733,736.
321. 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
322. 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
323. See ColoradoRepublican, 518 U.S. at 615-16 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion); Eu, 489 U.S. at 22325.
324. Storer,415 U.S. at 726, 728.
325. Id. at 736.
326. Id. at 735. The statute was effective because it prevented "defeated primary candidates [from]
running as independents... to continu[e] the struggle .... " Id.
327. See Petitioners' Brief at 19-23, wherein the Petitioners argued that: "The Primary Is the Major
Theater for Resolving Ideological Struggles Within a Political Party." Id. at 19 (quoting part of the
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Rosario concerned the validity of New York's requirement that "a voter...
enroll in the party of his choice at least 30 days before ...[a] general election in
November in order to vote in the subsequent party primary. ''32s Although this
requirement imposed a lengthy time period on voters' decisions to change parties,
the Court upheld it because it served the State's particularized legitimate purpose
of protecting parties, and the integrity of the electoral process, from the damaging
effects of raiding. 329 Concern over the potentially debilitating effects of raiding on
political parties was raised with intensity by the political parties during the District
Court proceedings. 330
In Colorado Republican, a splintered Court held that restrictions on political
parties' campaign expenditures "made independently, without coordination with
any candidate," violated the parties' First Amendment free speech and association
rights. 331 The plurality opinion by Justice Breyer, which was joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter, simply extended to political parties the benefit of previous
cases in which the Court ruled that limitations on independent expenditures by
individuals and groups were unconstitutional. 332 In doing so, the plurality Justices
extolled the electoral function of political parties by observing that:
[a] political party's independent expression not only reflects its members' views
about the philosophical and governmental matters that bind them together, it also
seeks to convince others to join those members in a practical democratic task, the
task of creating a government that voters can instruct and hold responsible for
subsequent success or failure. The independent expression of a political party's
views is "core" First Amendment activity no less than is333
the independent expression
of individuals, candidates, or other political committees.

They bolstered this observation by noting that the legislative history of the
campaign finance laws "demonstrate[d] Congress' general desire to enhance what
was seen as an important and legitimate role for political parties in American
elections," 334 and reflected Congress' view that "'a vigorous party system is vital to
American politics ....
"'335
The role of political parties was exalted further in an opinion by Justice
Kennedy, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, that
concurred in the judgement but dissented in part by asserting that political parties
336
should be free to make coordinated expenditures on behalf of their candidates.
title to Petitioners' Argument I).
328. Rosario,410 U.S. at 754,761-62.

329. See id.
330. See DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1297.
331. Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 608, 614-20 (plurality opinion of Justice Breyer in which
Justices O'Connor and Souter joined); Id.at 628-31 (opinion by Justice Kennedy concurring in the
judgement but dissenting in part, which was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia); Id.
at 635-48 (opinion by Justice Thomas concurring in the judgement but dissenting in part, which was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia).

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.

See iL at 608, 614-20.
Id. at 615-16 (citation omitted).
Id. at 618 (citation omitted).
Colorado Republican,518 U.S. at 618 (citations omitted).
See id.
at 628-31.
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To justify this assertion, Justice Kennedy demonstrated how the function of
political parties served well the purposes of the First Amendment, by stating that
[t]he First Amendment embodies a "profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."...
Political parties have a unique role in serving this principle; they exist to advance
their members' shared political beliefs. A party performs this function, in part, by
"identify[ing] the people who constitute the association, and... limit[ing] the
association to those people only." ... Having identified its members, however, a
party can give effect to their views only by selecting and supporting candidates. A
political party has its own traditions and principles that transcend the interests of
individual candidates and campaigns; but in the context of particular elections,
candidates are necessary to make the party's message known and effective, and vice
337
versa.
Writing for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia, Justice
Thomas declared his belief that it was unconstitutional to limit anyone's political
contributions and expenditures. 338 But, he further declared that he would lift all
restrictions on political parties' political contributions and expenditures even if he
were convinced that "a principled distinction between contributions and
expenditures" existed.339 He justified this declaration on grounds that the anticorruption rationale of the campaign finance laws "loses its force" "[a]s applied in
the specific context of campaign funding by political parties,"mo since
[t]he very aim of a political party is to influence its candidate's stance on issues and,
if the candidate takes office or is reelected, his votes. When political parties achieve
that aim, that achievement does not, in my view, constitute 'a subversion of the
political process;' ... that is successful advocacy of ideas
in the political
341
marketplace and representative government in a party system.
Taken together, the three opinions constituting the decisional majority in
Colorado Republican expressed forcefully the view that political parties play a
vital role in the American electoral process by binding together persons of
common political ideology and then using their combined resources to express
their political beliefs through the election of candidates supporting those beliefs.
This view largely parallels the Petitioners' arguments that political parties have
First Amendment associational rights to choose standard bearers who support
their ideological beliefs and to insure that ideologically compatible standard
bearers will be selected by barring non-members from their nominating
processes" 2
It also rejects the Respondents' assertion that "expressive
interests... fail to rise to the level of protected associational interests in
elections... [because 'b]allots serve primarily to elect candidates, not as fora for

337. Id. at 629 (citations omitted).

338. See id. at 635-48.
339.
340.
341.
342.

Id. at 644.
Id. at 646.
Colorado Republican, 518 U.S. at 646.
See Petitioners' Brief at 38-40.
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political expression. 3

In Eu, California, relying heavily on Storer, defended its ban on governing
bodies of political parties endorsing candidates in primaries by asserting that it
had a compelling interest in preventing the "significant damage to the fabric of
government" that may arise from "splintered parties and unrestrained
factionalism." 3 4 After finding that the endorsement ban suffocated the right of
political parties to "select a 'standard bearer who best represents the party's
ideologies and preferences," ' 345 the Court rejected California's justification for it
by stating that "[o]ur decision in Storer... does not stand for the proposition that
a State may enact election laws to mitigate intraparty factionalism during a
primary campaign."3 "To the contrary," said the Court, "[a] primary is not47
hostile to intraparty feuds; rather it is an ideal forum in which to resolve them.0
Again, the Court expressed a view as to the purpose of primary elections that
perfectly matched the Petitioners' arguments 48
Even though the weight of sentiment expressed in key U.S. Supreme Court
cases seemed to favor the Petitioners, the Respondents still had reasons to feel
optimistic. Only one of these cases, Tashjian, involved a direct confrontation
between state election laws and party nominating rules, and it favored enhancing
the democratic nature of the election process 49 Respondents had done a credible
job of distinguishing the facts of Eu from those of Jones.350 More importantly,
Respondents had made a strong case, empirically and through credible expert
opinion witnesses, that the blanket primary would rarely alter the outcomes of
elections 35' or produce outcomes significantly different than those produced by
open primaries and closed primaries with liberal registration rules.352 In short,
Respondents had demonstrated rather convincingly that blanket primaries in fact
do not impose severe burdens on the political parties' associational rights. As a
consequence, under the Timmons standard, they needed only to show that the
blanket primary reasonably served an important State interest. 3 Of the State
interests they cited, one - providing all voters with "a meaningful say in who
35 4
represents them without also forcing them to abandon their political affiliation
- seemed especially to qualify as the magic important State interest, and it could in
reality be served only by a blanket primary.3 5 Thus, while the outcome of Jones
343. Respondents' Brief at 36-37 (citation omitted).
344. Eu, 489 U.S. at 227-28.

345. Id. at 224-25.
346. Id. at 227 (emphasis added).

347. Id.
348, See Petitioners' Brief at 19-23, wherein the Petitioners argued that: "The Primary Is the Major
Theater for Resolving Ideological Struggles Within a Political Party." Id. at 19 (quoting part of the
title to Petitioners' Argument I).
349. See DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1301.
350. See Respondents' Brief at 22.
351. See id. at 27-31.
352 See id. at 30-33.
353. Timmons, 520 U.S. at 358.
354. Respondents' Brief at 44.

355. See id. at 48.
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was not shocking, the Respondents and dispassionate observers could have been
forgiven for feeling somewhat surprised.
B.

The OralArguments

The oral arguments did not go well for the Respondents. Justice O'Connor
asked 'Is the fundamental assumption that it's for the voters to tell the
3 56
Republican Party or the Democratic Party what those parties should stand for?
When he answered negatively, stating that 'the fundamental assumption is that
the election belongs to the voters,"' Justice O'Connor replied that 'The very
Amendment right is to define its own message and
essence of the party's First 357
send out its own candidate."'
Other justices also weighed in with commentary unfavorable to the blanket
358
primary. Justice Scalia denounced it as "'democracy carried to an extreme."'
Justice Breyer came to the defense of minor parties, proclaiming that they 'are
committed to an ideal"' and "'do not want to be saddled with a candidate who
doesn't reflect their ideals.' 3 9 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy were
skeptical about the impact [of the blanket primary]
also reported as being "openly
'' 60
messages.
on parties' policy
Justices' questions and comments during oral arguments are not necessarily
determinative of a case's outcome. In this case, however, a majority of justices
expressed support for the political parties, causing news reporters to conclude that
blanket primaries would be declared unconstitutional. 61
C.

The Decision

Justice Scalia wrote a majority opinion that in many ways reads as if it were
drafted by the Petitioners. He first rejected Judge Levi's broad holding that the
processes for nominating general election candidates is such a public function that
States have pervasive authority to regulate how parties select their nominees. 362 In
doing so, Justice Scalia carefully distinguished past cases vindicating the States'
authority to regulate nominating processes from Jones, finding that they did not
hold "that the processes by which political parties select their nominees are ...

356. Bury Party,supranote 66.
357. Id.
358. Lyle Denniston, Supreme Court Hints At Curbs On CrossoverPrimaryVoting; Califs "Blanket"
System Penalizes Parties, O'ConnorSays, THE BALTIMORE SUN, Apr. 25, 2000, at A6 [hereinafter
Penalizes Parties].

359. Id.
360. Id.
361. See Penalizes Parties,supranote 358; Joan Biskupic, Justices Question CaliforniaPrimaryLaw,
THE CHICAGO SN TIMIES, Apr. 25, 2000, at News 22; David G. Savage, Justices Sound Dubious of
"Blanket Primary,"Los ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 25,2000, at Al; Marc Sandalow, Court Hears Challenge
to State's Voting Law: Justices Seem Skeptical About Open Primaries, THE SAN FRANCISCO
CHRONICLE, Apr. 25,2000, at Al.

362. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2406-07 (countering Judge Levi's holding found at DistrictJones, 984 F.
Supp. at 1296).
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wholly public affairs that States may regulate freely. 3 63 Conceding that an
election is a public affair, he nevertheless concluded that "when the election
determines a party's nominee it is a party affair as well, and.., the constitutional
rights of those composing the party cannot be disregarded.'
Turning to the task of defining generally the political parties' associational
rights, Justice Scalia proclaimed that "[r]epresentative democracy in any populous
unit of governance is unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together
in promoting among the electorate candidates who espouse their political
views. 3 65 Alluding to the nation's long tradition of political parties serving the
political interests of the politically active,3 Justice Scalia noted that the Court had
honored this tradition by "recogniz[ing] that the First Amendment protects 'the
freedom to join together in furtherance of common political beliefs,' 67 which
'necessarily presupposes the freedom to identify the people who constitute the
association, and to limit the association to those people only.' ' ' 36s He then opined
that "a corollary of the right to associate is the right not to associate. '' 369 Thus,
Justice Scalia affirmed the Petitioners' contention that "Itihe very concept of a
political party presupposes the exclusion of those who do not share [its]
interests .... ,370
Applying his corollary to the process of nominating general election
candidates, Justice Scalia asserted that "[i]n no area is the political association's
37
right to exclude more important than in the process of selecting its nominee. '
He justified this assertion by observing that the nomination process "often
determines the party's positions on the most significant public policy issues of the
day, and even when those positions are predetermined it is the nominee who
becomes the party's ambassador to the general electorate in winning it over to the
party's views." 372 As a consequence, Justice Scalia held that "California's blanket
primary violate[d] the [political parties associational rights] ... [because it] forces
363.

Md at 2406-07, where Justice Scalia cited past cases as recognizing the right of States to force

parties to use primary elections as the means of choosing their general election candidates, "require
parties to demonstrate 'a significant modicum of support' before allowing their candidates a place on
that ballot;" and "prevent 'party raiding' [by] requir[ing] party registration a reasonable period of time
before a primary election."
Justice Scalia took particular pains to distinguish the prior cases in which the Court invalidated
party actions impeding the participation of African-Americans in nominating processes. These cases,
he said held only that, "when a State prescribes an election process that gives a special role to political
parties, it 'endorses, adopts and enforces the discrimination against Negroes,' that the parties (or...
organizations that are 'part and parcel' of the parties...) bring into the process-so that the parties'
discriminatory action becomes state action under the Fifteenth Amendment.... They do not stand for
the proposition that party affairs are public affairs, free of First Amendment protections ......
Id. at 2407 (citations omitted).
364. Id. at 2407 n.4.
365. Id. at 2408.
366. See id.
367. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2408 (citing to Tashjian,479 U.S. at 214-215).
368. Id. at 2408 (citing to La Follette, 450 U.S. at 122).
369. I1&at 2408.
370. Petitioners' Brief at 40.
371. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2408.
372 Id.
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political parties to associate with-to have their nominees, and hence their
positions, determined by-those who, at best, have refused to affiliate with the
party, and, at worst, have expressly affiliated with a rival. 373 In so doing, he
essentially ratified the Petitioners' contention that the political party's
associational rights especially include the right to use primary elections to settle
intraparty differences by selecting general election candidates who will best
present the ideology of the party's dominant group to the general public. 374
Justice Scalia sided completely with the Petitioners in the burdens battle.
Essentially, he found the Respondents' evidence that cross-over voting would
rarely change the outcome of elections to be irrelevant to whether the blanket
375
primary imposed a severe burden on the associational rights of political parties.
He did so because he adopted the Petitioners' view that blanket primaries severely
burden political parties' associational rights by causing primary candidates to take
"somewhat different positions" than they would have in a closed primary in order
to win primary elections.376 Moreover, Justice Scalia did not require evidence that
position shifting would occur to support his conclusion that it would.37 It was
proof enough for him that the purposes of California's blanket primary "w[ere] to
favor nominees with 'moderate' positions... [and] encourage[ ] candidates-and
officeholders who hope to be renominated-to curry3 78favor with persons whose
views are more 'centrist' than those of the party base.
Having found that blanket primaries will produce the "likely outcomeindeed.., the intended outcome-of changing [a] parties' message," 379 Justice
Scalia held that it was not constitutionally relevant that they would leave
unimpeded the parties' rights to endorse candidates, financially support
candidates, maintain "orderly internal party governance, maintain[ ] party

373. Id. at 2409. To support this holding, Justice Scalia cited empirical and expert opinion evidence
tending to show that "the prospect of having a party's nominee determined by adherents of an

opposing party is far from remote ....
" Id. at 2410, and that "[t]he impact of voting by nonparty
members is much greater upon minor parties .... Id.

374. Petitioners' Brief at 17, 19-20, 26, 38-40.

Justice Scalia also rejected the Respondents'

contention that invalidation of blanket primaries would also invalidate open primaries and closed
primaries with liberal registration rules because they all have about the same effect on the associational

rights of political parties. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2409-10 (liberal closed primaries); Id. at 2410 n.8 (open
primaries) (See Respondents' Brief at 10, 30-33, for Respondents' arguments about the comparative
effects of blanket, open, and liberal closed primaries on political parties' associational rights). Justice
Scalia distinguished the liberal closed primary by noting that it requires a voter intending to cross-over
to "formally become a member of the party," Id. at 2409, and then limits the voter to voting only "for

candidates of that party." Id. at 2410. He distinguished the open primary on grounds that the act of
voting in the primary of party to which one is not affiliated is in a sense "an act of affiliation with...

[that] party." Id. at 2410 n.8 (citing to J. Powell's dissent in La Follette).
375. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2410-11.
376. See id.at 2411. See Petitioners' Brief at 33-38. Justice Scalia also expressed his belief that a
party could be destroyed if the votes of nonmembers altered even one primary election, Id. at 2410-11,
and illustrated it by suggesting that the "fledgling Republican party" would have disintegrated in 1860

if its "opponents... had been able to cause its nomination of a pro-slavery candidate in place of
Abraham Lincoln." Id. at 2410.
377. See id. at 2411.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 2412.
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discipline in the legislature, and conduct[ ] campaigns. 3 ° He supported this
holding by observing that "[the Court has] consistently refused to overlook an
unconstitutional restriction upon some First Amendment activity simply because
it leaves other First Amendment activity unimpaired. 381
Justice Scalia's holding that California's blanket primary severely burdened
the associational rights of political parties meant that the State had to demonstrate
that the blanket primary "is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest. ' 3 2 Finding the State's demonstration to be wanting, he held that the
blanket primary did not serve any legitimate compelling interest and was not
narrowly tailored to do so if in fact it did.an
The Respondents' had argued that States have compelling interests in
"producing elected officials who better represent the electorate and expanding
candidate debate beyond the scope of partisan concerns." 3 4 Justice Scalia
characterized these interests as "simply circumlocution for producing nominees
and nominee positions other than those the parties would choose if left to their
own devices. ' '3e As a consequence, he forcefully held them to be unlawful after
concluding that they "reduce to nothing more than a stark repudiation of freedom
of political association... [since they are premised on the belief that p]arties
should not be free to select their own nominees because those nominees, and the
positions taken by those nominees, will not be congenial to the majority. ' M6
Justice Scalia also found that the Respondents' desire to expand the voting
rights of so-called disenfranchised voters was an illegitimate interest.3s First, he
rejected the notion that independent voters and members of minority parties in
safe districts were in any meaningful sense disenfranchised by closed primaries.
Closed primaries, he observed, do not deny such voters the right to vote per se, but
rather they merely deny nonmembers of the majority party the opportunity "to
participate in... the majority party's primary. '0' 8s He acknowledged that in safe
districts this denial could result in nonmembers of the majority party being
deprived of the opportunity to influence who will take office, 389 but he found this
to be of no constitutional significance since such voters could cure their problem

380. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2411.
381. Id. at 2412. For the record, Justice Scalia expressly rejected the endorsement and financial
backing arguments on grounds that endorsements often have little impact on voters and "do[ ] not
assist the party rank and file, [since they] may not agree with the party leadership.., but do not want
the party's choice decided by outsiders." Id. at 2411. He also found it highly improbable "[t]hat party
nominees will be equally observant of internal party procedures and equally respectful of party

discipline when their nomination depends on the general electorate rather than on the party
faithful...." Id.

382. ld. at2412.
383. See id. at 2412-14.
384. Id at 2412. See Respondents' Brief at 39-42 (blanket primary produces better representatives),
46 (blanket primary expands debate).
385. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2412.
386. Id.

387. See id. at 2412-13.
388. Id. at 2412-13.
389. See id.
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simply by joining the majority party.39 More importantly, he invoked past
precedent to hold "that a 'nonmember's desire to participate in [a] party's affairs
is overborne by the countervailing and
legitimate right of the party to determine
391
its own membership qualifications.'"'
Justice Scalia granted the Respondents a small measure of satisfaction by
finding that "four [other] asserted state interests - promoting fairness, affording
voters greater choice, increasing voter participation, and protecting privacy [welre not.., automatically out of the running. 0 92 But, he immediately
proclaimed that none of these interests was compelling given "the circumstances
of this case. 393
With respect to the supposed unfairness of forbidding nonmembers living in
safe districts to vote in the majority party's primaries, Justice Scalia commented
that "[i]f that is unfair at all (rather than merely a consequence of the eminently
democratic principle that-except where constitutional imperatives intervenethe majority rules), it seems to us less unfair than permitting nonparty members to
hijack the party. 3 94 Equating the Respondents' desire to afford voters greater
choice with "reduc[ing] the scope of choice.., by assuring a range of candidates
who are more 'centrist,"' he found that the State did not have a compelling, and
maybe not even a legitimate, interest in promoting choice. 395 He then found that
the interest in increasing voter participation suffered from the same defect as the
interest in affording voters greater choice, because it "is just a variation on the
same theme (more choices favored by the majority will produce more voters). 396
Finally, he simply declared that the privacy interest in preserving the
"confidentiality of one's party affiliation" was not a compelling State interest. 397
In the end, Justice Scalia held that California's version of the blanket
primary was not narrowly tailored to further the State's interests in promoting
fairness, affording voters greater choice, increasing voter participation, and
protecting privacy. He did so out of belief that nonpartisan blanket primaries
would serve all of these interests without violating the associational rights of
political parties because voters in such primaries do "not choos[e] a party's
3 98
nominee.

390. See id. In this regard, Justice Scalia admitted that the "cure" put the so-called disenfranchised
voter "to a hard choice," but he found this to be of no constitutional import because the choice to join
the majority party "is not a state-imposed restriction upon [the so-called disenfranchised voter's]
freedom of association, whereas compelling party members to accept his selection of their nominee is a
state-imposed restriction on theirs." Id.
391. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2413 (citing to Tashjian,479 U.S. at 215-216 n.6, which in turn cited Rosario
and Nader).
392. Id.
393. Id.
394. Id.
395. Id.
396. Id.
397. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2413-14, where he supported this declaration by citing to a number of federal
statutes requiring "a declaration of party affiliation as a condition of appointment to certain offices."
398. Id. at 2414. Justice Scalia described such nonpartisan primaries as follows:
[T]he State determines what qualifications it requires for a candidate to have a place on the
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D. A Critique
This critique is a blend of two perspectives: That of a constitutional law
professor who is not wedded to any particular legal philosophy; and that of a
person who has been a Democratic Party nominee for Congress, a Chairman of
Oklahoma's First District Democratic Party, and a member of the Oklahoma
State Democratic Party Executive Committee. The first perspective provides a
quasi-dispassionate check on the second, which is explicitly pro-partisan.
Curiously enough, both perspectives lead to the same conclusion: Justice Scalia's
determination that blanket primaries are unconstitutionally destructive of the
political parties' association rights is quite justified, but his supportive reasoning
fails to acknowledge legitimate State concerns borne of current political realities,
and suggests a solution for serving legitimate State interests while protecting the
parties' associational rights that in reality will do neither.
Based on the arguments presented in Jones, the nation's political history,
and current political trends, Jones should be viewed as a conflict over the rights of
three distinct groups of voters, which for purposes of this critique will be called
partisans, the apathetic, and individualists. As will be demonstrated, the political
nature of each group has lead partisans to oppose blanket primaries and the
apathetic and individualists to support them.
Partisans are persons who are motivated to be politically active by strong
political beliefs and socio-economic interests and believe their political goals can
best be achieved through the formation of ideologically-based political parties.3 9
They have derived their great faith in the efficacy of political parties from
American political history, for since the formation of Hamilton's Federalist Party
and Jefferson's Republican Party, partisans have used parties effectively to focus
public attention on their political beliefs and their material desires.4 °
Most partisans have been members of a major party, and therefore were
inspired to do the hard work of party-building by the very real expectations that
their parties would, by winning elections, convert their political beliefs into public

primary ballot-which may include nomination by established parties and voter-petition
requirements for independent candidates. Each voter, regardless of party affiliation, may
then vote for any candidate, and the top two vote getters (or however many the State
prescribes) then move on to the general election.
Id. This description is nearly identical to the blanket primary used in Louisiana; See Jones District,984
F. Supp. at 1292; Primary Change, supra note 58, at A3, so presumably Louisiana's blanket primary
survives Jones.
399. This definition was derived from the Petitioners' arguments that parties "exist to advance their
members' shared political beliefs," Petitioners' Brief at 17. "Candidates are necessary to make the
party's message known and effective" and that minor parties are especially burdened by blanket
primaries because they exist to give expression to political ideas out of the mainstream. Id. at 33-38. It
also is derived from the Professor Aldrich's description of how parties have been an essential feature of
the nation's political history because they have been the most effective means for ambitious politicians
to promote their political beliefs and careers. See WHY PARTEs, supranote 121, at 78-82, 98-156. See
also Renewal Amicus Brief, supra note 127, at 15 (the description of the role of parties in American
politics as described by the Northern California Committee for Party Renewal).
400. For a brief review of the efficacy of American political parties in all their forms; See WHY
PARTIES, supra note 121, at 278-83.
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policy and their material desires into government benefits. 40 1 A few have been
among those hardy political souls who have emerged periodically to form minor
parties, even though they knew their efforts would not likely result in political
victories, in order to focus public attention on political beliefs the major parties
rejected and/or socio-economic problems the major parties neglected.4
By engaging in the tasks of party building, partisans exhibit four
characteristics that separate them from the other two groups:
1.
They have a highly developed interest in government and politics;
2.
They are willing to work for an overall program of governing,
even if it includes some proposals to which they are indifferent or opposed, in
order to advance the common good of all members of the coalition;
3.
They are willing to work for the election of nominees that may
not have been their first choice, because to them advancing the program is more
important than advancing the political careers of particular individuals;
4.
They expect the officeholders they helped elect to put the parties'
platform into effect. °3
In short, partisans want to present to the voting public a coherent program
for governing that represents the ideals and needs of those party members who
actively support the party with their capital assets and their labor.4°4 They know
this requires the selection of nominees willing and able to promote their
platforms. 40 5 But, blanket primaries increase the chances that maverick candidates
can secure the combined support of disaffected members within their own parties,
cross-over voters from other parties, and independents necessary for winning
46
party nominations by adopting positions in defiance of their parties' platforms.
As a result, partisans are violently opposed to blanket primaries out of fear that
they will lead to the nomination of candidates who will not represent the views of
those whose efforts have been most instrumental in building effective political
parties. 407
The apathetic are persons who are not only turned off by the platforms
and/or candidates of existing political parties, but also lack the strength of political
beliefs or socio-economic interests necessary for forming alternative political
parties or electing independent candidates.4
For example, the apathetic may
include disaffected Republicans who are anti-union on labor relations issues and
401. See WHY PARTIES, supra note 121, at 180-82.
402. See John C. Berg, Beyond a Third Parly: The Other Minor Partiesin the 1996 Elections, in THE
STATE OF THE PARTiES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PARTIES 216-18

(John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea, eds., 3d ed. 1999).
403. See WHY PARTIES, supra note 121, at 180-82.
404. See id.
405. See id. at 182.
406. See Petitioners' Brief at 17.
407. See id.
408. This definition was derived from description of the disaffected voter in Avoiding Margins, which

created the scenario of moderate Republicans and Democrats reacting to being turned off by the more
extreme views of their parties' nominees by not voting rather than getting more involved politically

either to attempt to moderate their parties' views or to form a new moderate party more to their liking.
See supranote 76.
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pro-choice on the abortion issue, disaffected Democrats who are pro-union on
labor relations issues and anti-choice on the abortion issue, and independents
whose beliefs are the same on these issues as either disaffected Republicans or
disaffected Democrats. 4°9 In other words, the apathetic often find a few proposals
among the many contained in the platform of each existing party they just will not
support, and as a consequence they tend not to support their parties' nominees.410
Faced with this dilemma, disaffected Republicans and disaffected Democrats
could choose to attempt to reform their parties' platforms or influence the
selection of more exciting nominees by getting more involved in party affairs.
Alternatively, they could reach out to independents and the disaffected in other
parties who share their views to form new parties or support independent
candidacies. But, given the low intensity of their political interests, such activities
are too burdensome for the apathetic to undertake.4n Instead, they tend to vote
for party mavericks in primary elections and increasingly sit out general elections
if their preferred primary candidates do not win.412 It is therefore predictable that
the blanket primary is very attractive to the apathetic, for it will permit the
disaffected within each party to vote for any maverick regardless of his or her
party affiliation and let independents cast what may be the deciding votes that put
maverick candidates into general elections.
Best of all, the blanket primary gives a free ride to the apathetic and the
maverick candidates they support. The nomination of a major party is still one of
the most important assets a candidate can have in a general election, for it
provides her with a potent political name brand that has been invested with great
electoral value by the dollars and sweat of partisans.413 As Senator John McCain's
recent presidential primary victories in open primary states illustrate, blanket
primaries give maverick candidates a very real chance of winning the nominations
of their parties, despite receiving poor support from their party faithful, by
capturing the votes of outsiders.414
Individualists are hybrids of the other two voter groups. Like the partisans,
individualists have strong political beliefs or economic interests they want
converted into public policies and government benefits. 415 Like the apathetic,

409. See id. at B7.

410. See The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Retro-Politics: The Political Typology
- Version 3.0, Section IX. The Disaffecteds, <http:lwww.people-pres.orgtypo99sec9.html>which
describes this voting group as "distrustful of government, politicians and business corporations,"
favoring the creation of a third major party, "anti-immigrant, and intolerant of homosexuals." They
also have a poor voting record. Id.
411. See id.
412. See Avoiding Margins, supra note 76, at B7. See also Otis White, So Who Answered Duke's
Call, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 1, 1991, at 1D [hereinafter Duke's Call].

413. See WHY PARTIES, supra note 121, at 289-90.
414. See Rocky Road, supra note 42, at Al (describing how John McCain won the Michigan

Republican Primary despite losing 2/3rds of the Republican vote because he captured the lion's share
of the vote from cross-over Democrats and Independents, which collectively constituted more than
50% of the Republican Primary vote).
415. See Jeffrey M. Berry, THE NEW LIBERALISM: THE RISING POVER OF CITIZENS GROUPS 2

(1999).
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their political interests are narrower than those served by the platforms of most
political parties, so they have little interest in forming416broad-based coalitions and
working for common good of all who are within them.
Given these political perspectives, individualists rarely involve themselves in
party-building.417 Instead, they tend to support special interest political action
committees and lobbying organizations that interact directly with candidates and
officeholders to influence their views and votes. 418 This encourages candidates to
become political parties unto themselves by adopting the combination of political
positions most favored by the general election electorate and raising the necessary
campaign war chest from the contributions of special interest political action
committees. 419 Such free agent candidates should, if nominated, have a better
chance of winning general elections than those who feel obligated to run on party
platforms, because party platforms rarely consist of the combination of political
positions most favored by the general election electorate. 420 More importantly,
should a majority of a legislative body be comprised of such candidates, there
would be substantial agreement among its members on major policy issues, and its
members would have every incentive to enact legislation favorable to all the
special interest groups that helped elect them.421
Individualists see the blanket primary as the best means of producing free
agent candidates, for it enables, indeed requires, all primary candidates to solicit
support from the general electorate, not just from their parties' members. Not
only does the outcome of such primaries insure that the individualists' preferred
candidates have adopted the set of positions most attractive to the general
electorate, it also increases the chance that the nominees of both major parties will
favor the individualists' political views. Like the apathetic, the individualists will
also enjoy a free ride, for their preferred candidates will have secured major party
nominations, despite possibly not being preferred by the builders of their parties.
Viewing Jones as a conflict of voting rights among partisans, the apathetic,
and individualists makes it clear that Justice Scalia's decision to invalidate
California's blanket primary was correct constitutionally, politically and ethically.
The desire of the apathetic and individualists to pursue their interests by coopting
major party nominations instead of doing the heavy lifting necessary to change a
party from within, start a new party, or support independent candidates, signifies

416. See id. at 2, 167.
417. See id.
418. See Don Van Natta, Jr. and John M. Broder, The Democrats: The Lobbyists; A Trend Toward
Ambidextrous Investments, THE N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2000, at A23, describing the strategy of highrolling lobbying firms as they increase political support to the organizations and officeholders of the

two major parties so "they will have access and influence, no matter who wins...." Id.
419. See John J. Coleman, Party Images and Candidate-CenteredCampaigns in 1996: What's Money
Got to Do With It? in THE STATE OF THE PARTIES: THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY
AMERICAN PARTIES 337-53 (John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea, eds., 3d ed. 1999) explaining how in
this candidate-centered political era politicians seek to raise and spend the resources necessary to
establish a public image independent of his party label.

420. See id. at 337-42.
421. See Party Blurred,supra note 58, at Al.
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that the purpose of California's blanket primary was to alter the speech content of
the political parties' nominees. That the blanket primary would probably have
this effect was confirmed by the District Court, which found that blanket or open
primaries "may affect the positions that candidates take on political issues" and
"weaken[ ] the 'disciplining effect' of the primary challenge in requiring 'the
officeholders to carry out the party philosophy..."'422 This finding amply
supports Justice Scalia's holding that California's blanket primary imposed a
direct expressive injury on the associational rights of the political parties 423 that
had to be justified by California demonstrating that its blanket primary was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.424 It also supports his
holdings that the major purposes to be served by the blanket primary - electing
more representative officeholders and expanding the political debate - were
unconstitutional because they were just other ways of stating a desire to regulate
the content of the political parties' speech. 42s
Reflecting the desires of the apathetic and individualists to coopt the
nominations of major political parties, California's blanket primary was crafted to
produce party nominations, not just general election candidates. 426 Otherwise, as
Justice Scalia pointed out, it would have been designed to send only the two top
vote getters for each office to the general election rather than declare that the top
vote-getter in each party would appear on the general election ballot as his party's
nominee. 427 This nominating feature set up the delicate question of whether States
have the right to force parties to let outsiders help select their nominees in order
to give every voter, regardless of party affiliation, the opportunity to cast a
meaningful vote for her preferred candidate.
From a strictly legal viewpoint, Justice Scalia answered this question
correctly with a resounding NO! His caustic observation that a different outcome
would combine with Tashjian to skew the First Amendment so it would
"guarantee a party's right to lose its identity, but not to preserve it ' ' 42 exposed the
absurdity of holding that the associational rights identified in Tashjian work only
in one direction. His implication that every State would be constitutionally
required to adopt a blanket primary if voters had a "'fundamental right'.. .to cast

422. DistrictJones, 984 F. Supp. at 1299 (citation omitted). These findings effectively counter Justice

Stevens complaint that Justice Scalia failed to honor the district court's findings of fact and holdings
concerning whether the blanket primary severely injured the political parties' associational rights. See
Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2421-22 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
423. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2412.
424. See id.
425. See id. Justice Scalia supported this holding by analogizing Jones to Hurley v. Irish-American

Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995), wherein the Court invalidated the
use of Massachusetts' public accommodation law to force the South Boston Allied War Veterans
Council to include openly gay, lesbian and bisexual persons in their parade on grounds that a parade is
an expressive activity the speech content of which would be altered by the forced inclusion of
outsiders.

426. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2413-14.
427. See id. at 2414.
428. Id.at 2409 n.7.
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a meaningful vote for the candidate of their choice,' 2 9 revealed the potential for
the Respondents' position to limit the States' options as well as those of the
political parties.
Nevertheless, Justice Scalia only hinted at the fundamental unfairness, and
the potential political unsoundness, of imposing blanket primaries on unwilling
political parties. He did acknowledge that the "inequity of not permitting
nonparty members in 'safe districts' to determine the party nominee... [was] less
unfair than permitting nonparty members to hijack the party. '430 He also
observed that nonparty members who wish to participate in a party's primary
"have refused to affiliate with the party" [or] "have expressly affiliated with a
rival., 431 And, he vaguely alluded to the possible negative political consequences
of sapping the vigor of political parties through blanket primaries when he
declared that "[r]epresentative democracy in any populous unit of governance is
unimaginable without the ability of citizens to band together in promoting among
the electorate candidates who espouse their political views., 432 Still, he failed to
emphasize the arduous nature of the party-building activities performed by
partisans and assiduously avoided by independents and cross-over voters from
other parties (the apathetic and the individualists). He did not recall how the first
Congress, which was dominated by the type of free-agent representatives and
senators the individualists desire to elect through the blanket primary, was so
plagued by "unstable, shifting and chaotic" voting majorities that what little policy
evolved therefrom did so "with no guarantee of long-term consistency or clarity of
principle." 433 Nor did he discuss the difficulty that free-agent legislators would
experience in attempting to form cohesive governing coalitions based on coherent
governing strategies because each of them would be beholden to 43unique bevies of
interest groups that would shift in composition from issue to issue. 4
On the other hand, Justice Scalia's failure to drive home the justness and
political soundness of denying nonmembers the right to participate in a party's
nominating process was matched by his seeming insensitivity to the plight of
persons living in safe districts. That the safe seat phenomenon has become fixture
in many legislative districts has been graphically demonstrated by the increasingly
non-competitive congressional elections of the last quarter of a century. Only six
(6) incumbent members of Congress lost their seats in 1998, 435 and it has been over
429. Id. at 2407 n.5.
430. Id. at 2413.
431. Id. at 2409.
432 Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2408.
433. WHY PARTIES supra note 121, at 70-77 (quotes from 76-77).
434. See id. at 28-61 (developing theories that there are great incentives to form parties to solve the
problems of collective policymaking, social choice, electoral mobilization and political ambition); Id. at
194-240 (discussing how the candidate centered/candidate service parties of today still are capable of

forming governing coalitions to solve the problems of collective policy making, social choice and
political ambition); Id. at 287-96 (discussing how the current candidate centered/candidate service
parties still perform the coordinating functions required for coherent governing despite being of
substantially different form than the parties of Jefferson, Hamilton, Van Buren, and Lincoln).
435. See Craig Gilbert, Freshmen in House Likely to Win Again" Ryan, Baldwin, Green Have 'Done
Their Homework,' Raised Campaign Cash, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, July 2,2000, at 01A.
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twenty-five (25) years since "the re-election rate for incumbents dipped below 90
percent., 436 The 2000 campaign will be no exception, since analysts believe no
more than 50 of the 435 seats will be competitive, 437 a number that seems too high
given an early July analysis by ROLL CALL that only seventeen (17) races were a
toss-up. 438 Things are even more uncompetitive in Louisiana, a blanket primary
state, where it is anticipated that six (6) of its seven (7) incumbents "will run
unopposed or face only token challenges from underfinanced and little-known
opponents., 439 Yet, Justice Scalia simply advised nonmembers of dominant
parties living in safe districts to change their registration if they wanted to cast
meaningful primary election votes. 440
Justice Scalia's advice is not likely to be taken by many voters. The same
State that has non-competitive Congressional elections may also have very
competitive races for statewide executive offices. If so, voters in safe
Congressional districts may be loathe to disqualify themselves from voting in the
statewide primaries of their preferred party simply to gain the right to vote in the
Congressional primary of the dominant party. 441 Moreover, in many election years
such a trade-off would be a poor bargain, for most Congressional seats are safe
due to the advantages of incumbency, which means that competitive primaries will
occur in most Congressional districts only when the incumbent does not seek reelection.442 Perhaps this dearth of meaningful primary election opportunities
induced Justice Scalia to conclude that nonmembers of dominant parties living in
safe districts rarely suffer any real disadvantages by remaining ineligible to vote in
the dominant party's primaries. Still, it seems that democracy would be furthered,
and little harm would be done to political parties, if every voter, regardless of
affiliation, could vote in the primary of the dominant party when candidates from
that party are the only persons who file for a specific office. Justice Scalia's
opinion appears not to leave this option open. This is unfortunate, for a strong
case could be made that the main function served by primary elections that
determine who wins a public office is the predominantly public function of
electing a public official rather than the quasi-private function of establishing a
party's identity through the nomination of a general election candidate.

436. Eric Schmitt, The 2000 Campaign: The House; Former Incumbents Try to Reclaim Seats, THE
N.Y. TIMES, July 3,2000, at All.
437. See Catalina Camia, House, Senate Races Attracting Attention, Too; Democrats Stress Winning

Majority, THE DALLAS MORNING NEVS, Aug. 18,2000, at 23A.
438. See At a Glance: Races for U.S. House, STAR TRIBUNE, July 6,2000, at 12A (giving data from an
issue of ROLL CALL the date of which was not stated).
439. Bruce Alpert, LA. House Delegation Looking at Cakewalk, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE, July 16,
2000, at A01 [hereafter referred to as LA. Cakewalk].

440. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2413.
441. This trade-off will be forced because voters may only vote in the primaries of one party in
closed and open primary states. See id.
442. See Eric Schmitt, supra note 436, at All, noting that "[t]he powers of incumbency, including
paid government staff and free postage for mailing, are so potent that defeating a sitting member of
Congress has become very difficult." That difficulty was illustrated by the fact that 98% of incumbents

won in 1998, and the "re-election rate for incumbents [has not] dipped below 90 percent" since 1974.
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Justice Scalia's opinion failed to give proper attention to two persistent
trends in American politics over the last forty (40) years-the decline in voter
participation" 3 and the decline in party loyalty among voters. 444 As noted
previously, Justice Scalia summarily rejected California's claim that it had a
compelling interest in increasing voter participation because he found it was just
another way of saying that the State manipulated primary elections to insure that
the political parties nominate general election candidates more to the liking of the
voting majority.445 He failed to mention the decline of party loyalty and the fact
that persons identifying themselves as Independents have constituted a plurality of
the total American electorate for a decade 446 and approaches or exceeds a
majority of the electorate in some states. 447 As a consequence, he missed the

443. See Committee for the Study of the American Electorate (CSAE), Final Post Election Report
(visited Aug. 8, 2000) <http:lwww.gspm.org/csaelcgans5.html>,which found there has been a
persistent downward trend in voter turnout during non-Presidential election years since 1962. This
trend was reflected in the following table contained in the CSAE report:
Year
Percentage Voted
1998
36.06
1994
38.79
1990
36.53
1986
36.42

1982

40.09

1978
1974
1970

37.77
38.78
46.78

1966

48.61

1962
47.57
Id. at Chart II.
444. See Paul Allen Beck, The ChangingAmerican Party Coalitions,in THE STATE OF THE PARTIES:
THE CHANGING ROLE OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN PARTIES 28, 31 fig. 3.1 Party Loyalties, 19521996 (John C. Green & Daniel M. Shea, eds. 3d ed. 1999), which shows that the percentage of voters
identifying themselves as Independents has increased from about 22% in 1962 to about 35% in 1996.
See also The Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, Retro-Politics:The Political TypologyVersion 3.0, Section III. Parties (visited Aug. 3, 2000) <http:lIvww.people-press.org/typo99sec3.html>
[hereafter referred to as Pew Typology] which reported the following trends in party identification
from 1989 to 1999:
Year
% Republican
% Democrat
% Independent/Other
1999
27
34
39
1998
27
33
40
1997
28
33
39
1996
29
33
38
1995
32
30
38
1994
30
32
38
1993
27
34
39
1992
28
33
39
1991
31
32
37
1990
31
33
36
1989
33
33
34

445. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2413.
446. See Pew Typology, supra note 446, at Section III. Parties (which contains a table showing that
from 1989 through 1999 the Independent vote has constituted a plurality of the American electorate
with a percentage ranging from 34% to 40%).
447. See Shunning Loyalty, supra note 41, at Al, which reported that the 1999 Massachusetts
electorate was 49% Independents, 37% Democrats, 13% Republicans, and O'Callahan,914 P.2d at
1256, which reported that the 1994 Alaska electorate was 54% non-partisans or undeclareds, 23%
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opportunity to connect the two phenomena, for recent polling data confirm that
Independent voters are less likely to vote than voters who identify themselves as
Democrat or a Republican."4 This connection suggests that a State wanting to
increase voter turnout should adopt policies conducive to increasing the
percentage of voters who identify with one of the major parties. Blanket and open
primaries appear to have the opposite effect, 449 a fact Justice Scalia could have
used to make an important political policy argument against them.
By far, the most woeful part of Justice Scalia's opinion was his suggestion
that California could accomplish all of its interests, without violating the political
parties' associational rights, by adopting Louisiana's non-partisan version of the
blanket primary.450 However, recent elections in Louisiana demonstrate that its
variant of the blanket primary is prone to harming the interests of both the parties
and the State.
Louisiana's non-partisan blanket primary has harmed the political parties by
selecting general election candidates who ran under the label of parties which did
not want to be associated with them. The most egregious example was the 1991
governor's primary, which from eleven candidates produced a general election
featuring Republican David Duke, a neo-Nazi 51 who was a former Grand-Dragon
of the Ku Klux Klan, 452 and Democrat Edwin Edwards, a notorious gambler and
womanizer who had "barely survived two federal racketeering trials" after
enduring "sixteen corruption investigations. ''453 An anti-Duke faction, featuring
the slogan "Vote for the Crook: It's Important," rallied reluctantly to Edward's
cause, helping him defeat Duke handily. 4-4 But Edwards victory did not erase the
damage done to the credibility of Louisiana's political system, for Edwards
ultimately was convicted of racketeering crimes committed in his last term as
Governor. 455 Nor did it end the woes of the Republican Party, for just four years
Republicans, and 18% Democrats.
448. See The Gallop Organization, PollReleases: The 2000 PresidentialElection -A Mid Year Gallop

Report (visited Aug. 3, 2000) <http:llwww.gallop.com/poll/releaseslPrOOOt22q9.asp>
indicating that less
than 19% of persons deemed likely to vote are not identified with one of the two major parties. When
this figure is compared with Pew Typology report that independents constituted 39% of the electorate
in 1999, it is seen that independents are not very dependable voters. Reinforcing this conclusion is
information compiled in Section IX of Pew Typology (visited Aug. 3, 2000) <http://vvww.peoplepress.orgtypo99sec9.html>,which found that Independents constitute 73% of a voter group with the
second poorest voting participation record (The Disaffecteds) and 54% of a group that barely
participates in elections (Bystanders).

449. See O'Callaghan,914 P.2d at 1256.
450. See Jones, 120 S. Ct. at2414.

451. See Otis White, So Who Answered Duke's Call, ST. PETERSBURG TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1991, at 1D.
452. See Charles Cook, Why David Duke Can Actually Win Louisiana'sRunoff, ROLL CALL, Oct.
24, 1991, cited in Political Surveyor Section [hereinafter Duke Can]. Duke's candidacy embarrassed
the Republican party for the second time in two years, for he had defeated the "official GOP

contender" for the U.S. Senate in 1990. See Tim Curran, In Wake of Success by Edwards, Duke in La.
Gov. Primary,Republicans Face Bleak Future-IfFlamboyant Democrat Wins 4th Term, GOP Could
Lose Two Seats in Redistricting,ROLL CALL, Oct. 24, 1991.

453. Joe Drape and Christina Cheakalos, Edwards Says Duke's Rise is Over; He Decries Media
Spotlight, THE ATLANTA JOURNAL & CONSTITUTION, Nov. 18, 1991, at A01 [hereinafter Duke's

Over].
454. Id.
455. See Hugh Aynesworth, Edwards Fights On as Legal Woes Grow, THE WASHINGTON TIMES,
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later, Mike Foster, a Democrat who switched parties just in time for the election,
was elected Governor as a Republican. 456 Consistent with his non-Republican
past, Foster has since aggressively refused to do anything to build-up the
Louisiana Republican Party.457 In the most recent Louisiana election, the eight

state-wide officeholders running for re-election entered into a pact agreeing not to
interfere in each others' elections despite their parties opposition to it and the fact
that one candidate was facing a corruption investigation. 458 Partisan organization
of the Louisiana legislature has almost expired, 459 with coalitions based on interest
group support rather than parties controlling the outcomes of most legislative
issues. 460 Given this experience in Louisiana, it is ludicrous for Justice Scalia to
suggest that a non-partisan blanket primary will not harm the associational rights
of political parties simply because it does not select "a party's nominee."'461 Such a
holding would truly exalt form over substance.
Louisiana's non-partisan blanket primary has also harmed some of the
interests California invoked in defense of Proposition 198. Governor's primaries
have drawn such crowded fields that persons have been voted into the general
election with a vote total in the low thirties.462 The last five governors produced by
this system have been political mavericks not known for the ability to produce a
cohesive governing coalition.4 Worse yet, the corrupt Edwin Edwards won twice
during this period,464 and the 1991 governor's primary, occurring during a time of
465
economic stress, gave the public a choice between a crook and a neo-Nazi. All
this belies the claim that blanket primaries produce middle of the road general

Aug. 28, 2000, at A4.
456. See Party Blurred,supra note 58, at Al.

457. "He refused to attend the 1996 GOP convention in San Diego and has feuded with state GOP

Chairman Mike Francis. Though he has played a role in persuading some Democratic legislators to

switch parties, his populist-tinged policies do not always sit well with traditional Republicans." Party
Blurred, supra note 58, at Al.

458. See Party Blurred,supra note 58, at Al.
459. See id. (noting that the president of the Senate was "expected to be a [R]epublican even though

Democrats held "26 of the 39 Senate seats", and the number two position in the House was also

expected to be a Republican "even though Democrats... [hold] 73 of 105 House seats").
460. See Party Blurred,supra note 58, at Al.

461. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2414.
462. In the notorious 1991 crook v. neo-Nazi primary, the two general election candidates, Edwin
Edwards and David Duke, won 34% and 32% of the primary vote respectively out of a field of 11

candidates. See Duke Can, supranote 452, at Political Surveyor Section.
463. The notorious Edwin Edwards won in 1983 and 1991. See Robert Buckman, Louisiana
Governor in Sight of Landslide; FirstElection Without Runoff Since '83, THE WASH. TIMvES, Oct. 24,

1999, at C3 [hereinafter Louisiana Landslide]; See Duke's Over, supra note 453. Buddy Roemer's
maverick ways may have made the David Duke general election nomination possible in 1991, for he

won in 1987 as a Democrat, switched parties mid-term, and failed to coalesce Republican leaders
around him in 1991 for failure to reach out to Republican leaders, a failure that was perhaps

predictable because as "a quintessential maverick [he] never got along with Democratic leaders." See
Duke Can, supra note 452. Mike Foster, "a pro-business, pro-gun, rough-talking duck hunter whose

actions - such as passing a law allowing adults to ride motorcycles without helmets - give him a kind of
maverick appeal," won in 1995 and 1999. Anne Rochell Konigsmark, Governors' Races Show Party
Ties Weakening; Three Southern Contests Hinge More on Individual Strengths Than Affiliation, THE
ATLANTA JOURNAL & CONSTITUTION, Oct. 17,1999, at lB.

464. See LouisianaLandslide,supranote 463, at C3.
465. See Duke's Over, supranote 453.
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election candidates more representative of the electorate.
Meanwhile, on the legislative side, the safe district syndrome and special
interest politics appear to have expanded. Congressional races have become
almost entirely non-competitive, 466 and the State legislature seems to function
through the formation of ad hoc majorities organized by special economic
interests rather a coherent governing coalition borne of political parties organized
to promote competing visions of a stable governing philosophy.4 67 Not only has
Louisiana's blanket primary not produced the greater choices of candidates and
ideas promised by proponents of California's blanket primary, but the legislature
has become vulnerable to the problem of shifting majorities that prompted
Madison and Hamilton to form the nation's first two major parties.
Finally, from a partisan point of view, the boundaries of the political parties'
rights of association recognized in Jones are disappointingly narrow. At the outset
of his opinion, Justice Scalia closed off the possibility that the parties'
associational rights would include the right to choose their own nominating
processes by stating that "[w]e have considered it 'too plain for argument'.., that
a State may require parties to use the primary format for selecting their nominees,
in order to assure that intraparty competition is resolved in a democratic
fashion. ''4As But, as Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissenting opinion, this
"point has never been decided by [the Supreme] Court., 469
Given the rationale for the Jones' decision, that parties may not be able to
preserve their identities if they cannot exclude from their nominating processes
persons with little or no commitment to their political ideals,470 the belief that
States can force political parties to nominate their general election candidates
through primary elections should be reconsidered. Mere party registration, or the
satisfaction of state requirements for voting in the primary of a specific party, does
not necessarily signify a strong identity with the principles of a party. As Justice
Stevens noted in his dissent, a person can fulfill these membership-conferring
tasks
merely by asking for the appropriate ballot at the appropriate time or (at most) by
registering within a state-defined reasonable period of time before an election;

neither past voting history nor the voter's race, religion, or gender can provide a
47
basis for the party's refusal to "associate" with an unwelcome new member.
Ironically, it is he, rather than the defenders of the parties' associational rights,
466. See LA. Cakewalk, supra note 439, at A01.
467. See Party Blurred,supra note 58, at Al.
468. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2407 (citing American Party of Tex. v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 781 (1974))

[hereinafter American Party].
469. ld. at 2418 (Stevens, J., dissenting). This is confirmed by American Party,for the portion of it
cited by Justice Scalia actually allows for the possibility that parties could nominate their general
election candidates through conventions rather than primaries. See American Party,415 U.S. at 781,
where the Court stated "It is too plain for argument... that the State may... insist that intraparty
competition be settled before the general election by primary election or by party convention
(emphasis added).
470. Jones, 120 S. Ct. at 2408-12.
471. See id. at 2419-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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who recognized the "obvious mismatch between a supposed constitutional right
'not to associate' and a rule that turns on nothing more than the state-defined
timing of the new associate's application for membership." 472 This led him to
comment that "[a]lthough I would not endorse it, I could at least understand a
constitutional rule that protected a party's associational rights by allowing it to
refuse to select its candidates through state-regulated primary elections., 473 Such
a result would return the nomination decisions to the deliberations of party
activists and officeholders, who after all are the persons who have built the parties
and shaped their identities.
What then of the assertions that open primaries and closed primaries with
liberal voter registration requirements also subject political parties to the risk of
having their nominees and messages shaped by persons with little or no
attachment to their political philosophies? Senator John McCain's presidential
primary victories in open primary states, where he won despite losing most of the
registered Republican vote, certainly demonstrated the potential for open
primaries to strip away from party members the ability to select their own
nominees. And yet, Justice Scalia found great constitutional significance in the
fact that in closed primary states voters "must formally become a member of the
474
Going one
party" and then are "limited to voting for candidates of that party."

step further, he then intimated that open primaries may also survive Jones simply
because they limit the voter "to one party's ballot." 475 Being limited to one party's
ballot seems to be the flimsiest of connections to a party, one that Justice Scalia
rightly derided in Tashjian when he summed up his view of the open primary so
greatly sought by Connecticut Republicans by stating: "[t]he Connecticut voter
who, while steadfastly refusing to register as a Republican, casts a vote in the
Republican primary, forms no more meaningful an 'association' with the Party
than does the independent or the registered Democrat who responds to questions
by a Republican Party pollster." 476 It will be interesting to see which Scalia shows

up when a post-Jones constitutional test of open primaries reaches the Court.
V.

CONCLUSION

The big news from Jones is that the political parties' expressive rights were
given priority over the States' interest in expanding the voting options of primary
election voters. Key factors in this outcome were the overt desire of those backing
California's blanket primary to moderate the views of major party nominees,
which made it clear that blanket primaries were intended to be a means of
regulating the content of political speech, and the Court's unwillingness to treat
primary elections as purely public functions.
Left unclear is whether Jones established a broad or narrow precedent. The
472.
473.
474.
475.

dissenting).
Id. at 2420 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
Id at 2419 (Stevens, J.,
Id at 2409-10.
Id.at 2410 n.8.

dissenting).
476. Tashjian,479 U.S. at 235 (Scalia, J.,
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Court gave great emphasis to the importance of letting political parties preserve
their identities by selecting nominees willing and able to champion their visions
for governing. Carried to its logical extreme, this principle could forbid States
from requiring parties to participate in open primaries. In fact, it could be
extended far enough to forbid States from requiring parties to select their
nominees through primary elections. Such outcomes would be welcomed by those
who wish to help political parties become more vital in ordering our nation's
political debates. They will not materialize, however, if Justice Scalia's
speculation that open primaries are distinguishable from blanket primaries,
because they limit primary voters to one party's ballot, is ratified in a later case.
Of greater concern is Justice Scalia's suggestion that Louisiana's nonpartisan blanket primary does not infringe on the associational rights of political
parties. With its potential to kill all vestiges of partisanship, Louisiana's nonpartisan blanket primary reflects the Framer's dreams of a government without
faction. In practice, it has produced an endless stream of maverick governors and
a legislature subject to the shifting majority problem that induced Hamilton and
Madison to form the nation's first political parties.
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